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Financial Reporting of Diversified
Companies: Legal Implications*
By DONALD E. ScHwARTz**
The Needs of Investors and the Economic Setting
OUR economic structure grows increasingly complex. Both its
size and its shape have changed radically in 35 years. There wages a
steady struggle to comprehend it and to cope with it. Government,
essentially conservative and pragmatic, seeks to apply tested meth-
ods to new phenomena. The modern diversified, or conglomerate,
company is an example of such a new phenomenon.
Both legal and business considerations have accelerated the ten-
dency of corporations to grow by diversification and in the form of
conglomerate companies. Corporate growth results both from ac-
quisition and from internal sources. Growth by acquisition of com-
panies in the same business encounters serious anti-trust impediments
which may, indeed, rule out any significant horizontal combination.1
Vertical combinations, too, run into serious opposition from anti-trust
authorities.2 However, the same anti-trust rules are not applicable
to combinations which are neither horizontal nor vertical.3 Thus,
while conglomerate mergers do not, by any means, enjoy anti-trust
immunity,4 such combinations are judged by a more flexible policy
since they do not have the same impact on the market structure as
do horizontal and vertical combinations.5 It is interesting to observe
* An earlier version of this article, in abridged form, appeared in 23
The Business Lawyer 527 (1968). The Journal wishes to thank the editors of
The Business Lawyer for granting permission to reprint those portions of the
article which appeared in the earlier publication.
** Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
2 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964); see United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218 (1947).
3 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1315-16 (1965).
4 Cf. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); U.S. Dm'T oF
JusTIcE; MERGER GIDmmiEs (May 30, 1968), Teprinted in 1 TRADE REG. REP.
4430, at 6681 (1968).
5 Bison, The Von's Merger Case-Antitrust in Reverse, 55 GEO. L.J. 201,
231 (196S).
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that the proliferation of conglomerate mergers has prompted the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to undertake a study to see "whether new
legislation is necessary to bring the conglomerate merger movement
under control."
The legal compulsion for an acquisition-minded company to
seek combinations with companies engaged in diverse businesses coin-
cides with management thinking that this is sound business policy.
For example, Litton Industries, Inc., the most diversified large con-
glomerate company, has told its shareholders: "The day of the old
business maxim of putting your eggs in one basket and watching that
basket, is gone forever."
The business approach of diversifying by moving into several
fields is applicable whether growth results from acquisition or from
internally generated sources. Litton's explanation for growth in this
fashion is the desire to exploit opportunities in fields previously over-
looked because they were unrelated to the company's traditional
business. Research capabilities, as in the case of du Pont, can lead a
company into several fields.
Another motive for diversification may be to attempt thereby to
reduce risk and stabilize profits. A company which manufactures
military aircraft, for example, is vulnerable to political changes. It
can reduce that risk by developing capabilities for the manufacture
of office equipment, or by acquiring an office equipment company.
The tobacco companies have chosen this means of reducing the risk
of investment in their companies. A company which is in a low profit
field, such as a railroad, may find better profit opportunities for its
excess capital in a new and unrelated business. A company's mana-
gerial skills may be broader than its current business activities, or it
may be necessary to acquire the needed skills as it enters new fields.9
Investor interest in conglomerate companies has at times been
feverish, as the stock prices of such glamor conglomerates as Litton,
Ling-Temco-Vought, ITT, Gulf & Western Industries, FMC, and Tex-
tron,10 to name merely a few, have illustrated periodically. This, in
turn, creates a managerial drive to become a conglomerate company,
or to be recognized as one, in order to be in position to realize the
6 Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1968, at 1, col. 6, at 12, cols. 1-3 (Western
ed.).
7 O'Hanlon, The Odd News About Conglomerates, FORTUNE, June 15,
1967, at 175.
8 1966 LITTON INDusT Rs ANN. REP. 4.
9 See Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics & Law, 46 GEo. L.J.
672 (1958).
10 O'Hanlon, The Odd News About Conglomerates, FORTUNE, June 15,
1967, at 175, 177.
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rewards which accompany stock market favor." The market can
turn on its former favorites, as it did with conglomerates following
Litton's report of lower earnings for the first time in its history in
early 1968, but the investor interest in conglomerates has not been
extinguished.
The federal securities laws had as their original purpose the dis-
closure of full and accurate information for use by investors. 2 This
purpose has not changed in 35 years. The information may be
used for various decisions-whether to purchase securities, whether to
vote for management or opposition, whether to hold or sell a security
at a particular price. Essential to most of the decisions is detailed
financial information, principally a balance sheet and a profit and loss
statement.13 The financial reporting requirements of the securities
laws have not changed radically as modern economic life has changed.
While we seek to retain the best of tested methods, in the conserva-
tive and pragmatic spirit mentioned, we must ask whether our old
methods continue to serve our present needs. Specifically, it must be
determined whether, by complying with the present federal securi-
ties laws, conglomerate or diversified companies are furnishing suffi-
cient and appropriate information to investors to fulfill the purposes
of those laws.
The prevailing practice of diversified companies is to disclose the
results of operations of the aggregate enterprise. Litton, for exam-
ple, reported that its 1967 revenues were $1,561,510,000, of which 31
percent were generated by business equipment and supplies, 32 per-
cent by defense and space systems, 27 percent by industrial systems
and equipment, and 10 percent by professional products and serv-
ices.14 However, there is no comparable allocation of the $70,070,127
of net earnings. Moreover, the four groups of activity selected by
Litton comprise perhaps 18 separate business activities.15 Further,
while there are some companies that do break down net earnings by
divisions or product lines, as discussed subsequently, many, if not
most, diversified companies disclose less information than does Lit-
ton.' 6 The problem this creates, in the opinion of the Securities
11 The desire to get in step is illustrated by the comment of the Chair-
man of the Board of Tenneco., Inc., following his company's acquisition of
Kern County Land Co.: 'We're a conglomerate-and we should be compared
with them rather than other pipeline companies." Management-Tenneco
Lands Kern County, Bus. WEEK, July 22, 1967, at 97.
3.2 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 127 (2d ed. 1961).
13 Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMAP. PROB. 898, 910 (1965).
'4 1967 LITToN IDusTRIEs AN.. REP. 55.
15 O'Hanlon, The Odd News About Conglomerates, FORTUNE, June 15,
1967, at 175, 175-76.
16 One study of financial reporting of 70 diversified companies revealed
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and Exchange Commission (SEC), was stated by Chairman Manuel
F. Cohen as follows:
The most important change, as you are of course well aware, is the
growing tendency toward absorption of separate industrial enterprises
into large conglomerate companies. Each time one of these enter-
prises is absorbed, and ceases to publish separate financial state-
ments, the available information about the industry in which that
enterprise is engaged is correspondingly reduced. Acceleration of the
trend toward absorption of these independent enterprises makes it
increasingly difficult for investors and others to draw intelligent con-
clusions about the affairs and prospects of companies in the particu-
lar industries-of either the conglomerate companies or of independent
companies. This creates a very real threat to the ability of independ-
ent investors to reach informed investment decisions, which Congress
has recognized as a basic prerequisite to a healthy securities mar-
ket.17
It is in this context that the SEC is giving consideration to in-
creasing the amount of financial information required to be disclosed
by diversified companies. Chairman Cohen has questioned whether
"we should be looking toward a defined operating profit and loss state-
ment on a division basis as the next objective beyond the breakdown
of sales for the conglomerate company."' 8 Further details are lack-
ing as to the methods by which the information would be disclosed,
or the precise additional information which would be required, but
in essence the Commission would require companies engaged in
diversified businesses to give some detail as to the profitability of
the various material segments of the company.
Primarily as a result of the concern expressed by the SEC, the
Financial Executives Institute undertook a study, through its re-
search arm, the Financial Executives Research Foundation, to deter-
mine whether expanded financial reporting would be desirable, and, if
so, to determine the best means of achieving it. The SEC deferred
that only 10 made any breakdown of net earnings, but this was considered
an unrepresentatively high percentage of the number sampled since the 10
were chosen for the reason that they made such breakdown and were not the
result of a random selection. M. BACKER & W. MCFARLAND, ExTExNAL REPORT-
ING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BusINEss 41-64 (1968) (research study of National
Association of Accountants). The Wall Street Journal reports that the num-
ber of conglomerates which will furnish profit breakdowns should increase
from 17 to perhaps 60 this year, but even this larger number is relatively
small. Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1968, at 1, col. 6, at 13, cols. 1-2
(Western ed.).
17 Hearings on S. Res. 191 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. pt. 5, at 1983
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Economic Concentration Hearings].
18 Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, before the Nineteenth
Annual Conference of the Financial Analyst Federation, May 24, 1966, in The
SEC and Accountants: Co-operative Efforts to Improve Financial Reporting,
J. ACCOUNTANcY, Aug. 1966, at 57, 60 [hereinafter cited as Cohen Address
before the Financial Analyst Federation].
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promulgation of any new rules until the study was completed. The
study was directed by Dr. Robert K. Mautz, professor of accounting
at the University of Illinois, and its extensive findings and recom-
mendations were published in July, 1968.19 In essence, the report
found a need for extended disclosure by certain companies and recom-
mended means by which it should be met. Similar recommendations
were made earlier by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA) ,20 and the National Association of Accountants. 21
These reports, and the increase in extended reporting on a voluntary
basis, are certain to affect the substance of the SEC's proposals.22
The Commission's response to the changes brought on by the
emergence of conglomerate companies as an important economic
factor has certain legal implications which must be carefully explored.
Expanded disclosures will mean that companies, and perhaps their
auditors, will have additional requirements to meet. These addi-
tional requirements may present more serious risks of legal liability
than now exist. The gravity of these duties and risks is the nub of the
question presented here. The perspective of this inquiry should be a
desire to fulfill the goals of the securities laws without imposing
legal consequences so drastic as to make the game not worth the can-
dle. As Dr. Mautz pointed out in his study, "those who are respon-
sible for published financial statements must never forget that they
may be held liable for the reliability and understandability of the
data which they issue. Heavy legal responsibility is part of the en-
vironment in which financial executives and Certified Public Account-
ants live .... ",23
Substantial business and accounting problems have been raised
which question the desirability of the SEC proposal; 24 indeed, the
earliest objection to product line reporting came from the SEC itself.25
The answers to these questions will in turn depend partly on the
19 R. MAUTZ, FINANCIAL REPORTING BY DIVEsIrIED CoMrPANIEs (1968)
[hereinafter cited as MAUTz].
20 Accounting Principles Board, Disclosure of Supplemental Financial
Information by Diversified Companies, J. AccouNTANcy, Oct. 1967, at 52.
21 M. BACKER & W. MCFARLAND, ExTERNAL REPORTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A
BusINEss (1968).
22 See 33 SEC ANN. REP. 45 (1967).
23 MAuTZ 21.
24 Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend or Foe?, 22 Bus. LAw. 317
(1967); Bows, Problems in Disclosure of Segments of Conglomerate Compa-
nies, J. AccOuNTANcY, Dec. 1966, at 33; Goodrich, Executive's View of
Corporate Reporting Responsibilities, FNANcIAL EXECuTIVE, Dec. 1966, at 16;
Greer, The Chop Suey Caper, J. AccouNrAwcy, Apr. 1968, at 29; Rappaport,
Problems in Product Line Reporting, 48 LBn& J. 3 (1967).
25 SEC Memorandum of June 4, 1965, appended to Economic Concentra-
tion Hearings, pt. 2, at 1069-71 (1965).
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manner in which the SEC exercises the broad authority which it
possesses.
Clearly, difficult definitional and judgmental problems of an ac-
counting nature are created by a proposal for product line report-
ing.26 Pertinent questions in this area are: Which companies will
be affected? which product lines or product line groupings will be
reported separately? and in which manner will joint costs and other
expenses attributable to several product lines be allocated? Balance
sheet allocations would be necessary to calculate return on invest-
ment, and that may be more perplexing than the income statement
problems. 27 The SEC has made no reference to balance sheet in-
formation, despite its significance to the information required.
Management is concerned that extended disclosures will involve
additional costs, will benefit competition, and will not provide com-
mensurate benefits to investors.28  To a great extent, these objec-
tions flow from the accounting difficulties involved. Many of these
difficulties are concerned with the determination of which segments
of a business should separately report sales and profits.
Dr. Mautz has noted that several methods are available whereby a
diversified company could report the financial status of its various
operations. These methods include breakdowns by: (1) legal entities,
(2) units within a company's own organizational chart, (3) a com-
pany's products, and (4) the various industries in which a company
is engaged.2 9 Dr. Mautz favored the last of these alternatives, with
the classification of the industries to be made by management.20
Certainly, such a practice might carry the requirement of extended
reporting beyond the so-called "conglomerate" company, a term
which, itself, may be difficult both to define and to identify.31
26 Halvorson, Accounting Aspects of Conglomerate Reporting, 23 Bus.
LAw. 549 (1968).
27 See Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend or Foe?, 22 Bus. LAw.
317, 329 (1967).
28 MAuTz 60 et seq.
29 Id. at 46.
30 Id. at 128. Throughout this article the term "product line reporting"
will be used to refer to extended reporting or reporting by segments. Its use
is indicative merely of the proposed change in reporting requirements and
is not intended as evidencing disagreement, or agreement, with Dr. Mautz'
views on the proper basis for segmenting a diversified company.
31 The difficulty with confining expanded disclosure to those companies
which may be defined as "conglomerate" is illustrated by the following obser-
vation: "Should multi-market companies be required to report in more detail
than they now do? Maybe they should-but the reasons advanced apply to
a great many companies that aren't ordinarily thought of as conglomerates,
and their advancement suggests, again, the extent of prejudice against con-
glomerates. The main contention, of course, is that when a company is in
many different markets and industries, it is hard for investors to have any
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In addition, management is concerned with the possibility that
allocation of joint costs may be required. Some financial executives
have pointed out that the allocation of joint costs between various
segments of a business is necessarily arbitrary and that consequently
investors would be confused or, worse, misled by such an allocation.
As noted earlier, however, Chairman Cohen proposed the reporting
of a "defined profit"32 which would leave the joint costs unallocated.
One business objection to this proposal has been that the resulting
"defined profit" will not enlighten investors and thus that reporting
of a "defined profit" would achieve none of the purported benefits of
extended disclosure but would merely impose all of its disadvantages.
The objective should be to achieve a pattern of financial reporting
which will result in optimum disclosure to the marketplace without
unduly burdening those who report. The achievement of that objec-
tive necessitates a careful analysis of why aggregate reporting of sales
and profits is inadequate, if that is the case, and of what can be
gained from some sort of breakdown.
Rationale of Product Line Reporting
It should be noted that while the proliferation of diversified com-
panies is relatively recent, there is nothing new in the quest for more
refined financial reporting. Thus, it was argued in 1939:
Investors are not so much interested in whether income comes
from the sale of goods or from the sale of services, as they are in
knowing from what goods and what services the income is derived.
For instance, in the income statement of General Motors, it would be
far more important for investors to know the percentage of gross reve-
nue derived from the sale of each line of cars, the percentage de-
rived from the sale of Frigidaires, and from the corporation's other
major activities than to know that a certain amount was derived from
the sale of 'goods' and the remainder from the operation of a railroad.
In large corporations, with many diversified types of activity, the dis-
closure of net sales and operating revenues, costs of goods and serv-
ices sold, and net operating income in total figures is not particularly
enlightening to the investor. In fact, the larger the corporation and
the more activities it engages in, the less significant gross revenue
figures will be to an investor or an investment analyst for pur-
poses of forecasting. Segregation within these items is necessary for
intelligent forecasting and evaluation.33
clear idea where the profits are coming from. If the objective is to let inves-
tors in on what is making money, and what isn't, and what the amounts are,
then the discussion covers just about all multi-division companies; in fact the
requirement would seem to call for some reporting within particular divi-
sions." The Case for Conglomerates, FORTUNE, June 15, 1967, at 163-64
(editorial).
32 Cohen Address before Financial Analyst Federation at 60; see Halvor-
son, Accounting Aspects of Conglomerate Reporting, 23 Bus. LAW. 549 (1968).
33 Kaplan & Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC,
48 YALE L.J. 935, 943 (1939) (emphasis added).
More recently, the need for extended financial reporting to show
profitability of at least certain segments of a diversified company was
summarized by Dr. Mautz:
Diversified companies do present special problems to investment
analysts, problems both in understanding the extent and nature of
their operations and of predicting the future growth and success of
such companies. An investor needs to know at least the variety,
types and relative importance of the several industries engaged in by
such a company in order to evaluate its overall competitive position.
Without such an evaluation, any forecast of its future prospects can
scarcely be well founded. Quite clearly, one component of a diversi-
fied company may have a trend line for profits, for risk or for poten-
tial growth which is at variance with development of the other com-
ponents. Depending upon the importance of the component and the
materiality of its difference from the others, this information may
be of considerable significance to investors. Such differences are not
revealed through combined reporting in a set of consolidated finan-
cial statements. Only if the investor has some knowledge of the
extent and present effects of such differences, does he have an ap-
propriate basis for anticipating the long term-influence of import-
ance.34
It is also interesting to observe that many of the arguments
against product line reporting have been urged and rejected in some-
what different contexts at earlier times. American Sumatra Tobacco
Company sought confidential treatment of its sales and cost of goods
sold for 1937 on the grounds that:
This disclosure, while of interest to the Corporation's competitors
and customers, is not in the public interest and it would have a very
serious effect on the prices at which this corporation would be able to
sell its products. Because of its one type of industry, the Corporation
is not in the position of many companies whose products are diversi-
fied and whose statements of sales and costs of sales include
many products, thereby not causing these companies to disclose the
amount of any particular product left on hand to its competitors and
customers.38
The irony here is obvious. Today the multi-product company
claims it will be harmed by product line reporting, and for the same
reasons urged 30 years ago by this single product company. The
diversified companies have enjoyed that type of blanket confidential
treatment for which American Sumatra petitioned exemption in the
SEC's discretion.
The Commission's response rejecting the application bears close
reading today. The Commission stated that investors would be bene-
fited by disclosure of sales and profit margins because "in order ei-
ther to judge the past or to forecast intelligently, an investor must
have not only a record of past earnings or losses, but also the signifi-
cant details as to how the particular results were obtained."3 6  The
84 MAUTZ, supra note 19, at 126-27.
85 American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 7 S.E.C. 1033, 1038 (1939).
36 II. at 1041.
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particular information sought about sales and cost of Sales was im-
portant to investors because there was no other way in which they
could gauge the effect on profits of changes in selling prices, wage
rates, material costs or other fluctuations. The relative size of the
gross profit margin was important in that a wide profit margin
might mean strength of the company's position if it were attributable
to factors which others could not duplicate, but might indicate vul-
nerability if due to factors which others could duplicate. Similarly,
a low gross profit margin could mean management weakness or con-
ditions not conducive to further competition.
Dr. Mautz's observations indicate the relevance of the SEC's posi-
tion to product line reporting: A company's experience with differ-
ent segments of its business may show disparities in profitability
and hence in risk, growth potential and management capability.3 7 If
so, the separate profit data of those segments is of as much interest to
today's investor as were the sales and cost of sales of the single
product produced by American Sumatra Tobacco Company, and
basically for the same reasons set forth by the Commission in 1939.
If the investor is to arrive at the same position the SEC thought
desirable almost 30 years ago, he needs more sophisticated tools of
analysis than are currently provided by most companies.
How can this goal be achieved by the contemplated proposal for
extended financial reporting? Dr. Mautz recommends "flexibility in
the fractionalization of diversified companies for financial reporting
purposes" and "the placement of the responsibility for such fraction-
alization where it righfully belongs, squarely upon company manage-
ment."38 He suggests that only those segments which comprise 15
percent of the total business be separately shown.39
Because of the diversity of possibilities available, as evidenced by
the reporting practices of those companies which do furnish extended
information, one could scarcely expect comparability of reporting be-
tween different companies. Dr. Mautz recommends that, as a corol-
lary of flexibility, there should be a "two-fold responsibilty, first to
describe clearly the nature of the profitability figure reported so that
those who read it may understand the meaning of what they have
presented to them; secondly a responsibility to disclose the methods
used in allocating common expenses and/or pricing intra-company
transfers if either of these items significantly affected the reported
income figure.140
37 MAUTZ, Identification of the Conglomerate Company. FncANCiAL ExEcu-
=vw, July 1967, at 18.
38 MAuTz, supra note 19, at 134.
39 Id. at 130.
40 Id. at 138.
The lack of uniformity which may be inevitable in product line
reporting is not sufficient reason to reject the proposal that reporting
be required. The financial community seems aware of the limita-
tions of extended reporting, and yet its members vigorously urge the
need for the information. 41 A leading member of the financial com-
munity has said that the lack of comparability is not important; what
is important is year to year consistency within a single company
whose profit breakdown is tailored to reflect the financial condition
of each of its segments.42
Two other views as to the desirability of product line reporting
deserve mention. The first is that the SEC financial reporting require-
ments have not benefited investors, and that therefore companies
should be free to report as they wish, provided that they tell the
public what they are doing. Moreover, it is argued, the proposal
to extend financial reporting to require product line reporting by
diversified companies is undesirable because it is impossible to allocate
joint costs in a meaningful way.43 This is one economist's opinion,
and while it may be shared by others, certainly it is not the prevailing
opinion. To deal with it fairly and completely is beyond the scope of
this article, but the assumptions herein are to the contrary: that
financial reporting has been improved by the SEC and that by and
large the investment community has gained from the SEC's efforts.
It is conceivable that this viewpoint is wrong; it is, however, in the
main stream.
The second viewpoint is voiced by certain groups who have re-
portedly suggested that those who need to know the information
can obtain it by personal inquiry.44 This position concedes the rele-
vancy of the information, but would limit its availability to a privi-
leged group with special access to insiders. This approach flies
squarely in the face of modern developments in the securities laws 45
41 The views of members of the investment community have been made
known from the time of the earliest discussions of product line reporting.
See testimony of Yura Arkus-Duntov, Economic Concentration Hearings, pt.
4, at 1705-06 (1966).
42 Parker, A View from Management--Comments, in PuBuc REPORTING
OF CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES 72-73 (1968) (symposium held at Tulane Uni-
versity, Nov. 1967).
43 Benston, The Effectiveness and Requirements of the SEC's Accounting
Disclosure Requirements, in SYmposIum ON EcoNoMIc POLICY AND THE REGU-
LATION OF CORPORATE SECURTIES (1968).
44 Letter from Committee on Relations with Securities and Exchange
Commission to Clifford V. Heimbrucher, Sept. 2, 1966, at 7, 9 (reporting
views of Financial Executives Institute and Investment Bankers Association)
(copy on file in the Hastings Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Heimbrucher
Letter].
45 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,251 (2d
Cir., Aug. 13, 1968), aff'g in part 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cady,
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and must be rejected emphatically.
Thus, the tentative conclusion may be reached that the case for
extended financial reporting in some form is persuasive, although the
legal risks remain to be explored and, if found sufficiently serious,
might lead to a different conclusion.
Implementation of Product Line Reporting and Securities and
Exchange Commission Authority
The preceding observations indicate that product line information
would be useful-indeed, may be essential-but they do not tell us
how to obtain it. The exact proposal of the Commission will have to
be considered. No specific implementation of Chairman Cohen's
general suggestion has yet been put forth. But in his initial speech
on the subject, Chairman Cohen singled out several conglomerate
companies which provide a product line breakdown of profits.46 For
the most part, these companies include in the narrative portion of
their annual reports the sales and net income of each major product
line group of the enterprise. This breakdown does not appear as part
of the financial statement of the company and it is not included
within the scope of the opinion of the independent auditors. In some
cases, the joint costs, such as income taxes, financing charges, overall
administrative costs, institutional advertising and research and de-
velopment costs are allocated between various divisions, and in oth-
ers the joint costs are not allocated and there is shown instead a net
operating profit of each division before joint costs-generally what
Chairman Cohen referred to in his speech as "defined profit.' 47 In
two cases, the allocation of joint costs was certified by independent
auditors.48
While it is true that the presentation of "defined profit" is all
that the Commission has thus far publicly urged, it is not certain
that this is the limit of its proposal. Further, the presentation of a
"defined profit" would create special problems. Investors, unfamiliar
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corpo-
rate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Pro-
ceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271 (1965).
46 Cohen Address before the Financial Analyst Federation, supra note 18,
at 60. See also New Disclosures Noted in Annual Reports, FmANcYAL EXEcu-
TmVr, June 1968, at 68.
47 "9Defined profit" means income before joint costs. The industry re-
sponse to the SEC's suggestions of the use of "defined profit" has been luke-
warm. See Heimbrucher Letter, supra note 44, at 9.
48 DoLLY MADISON CoRP. ANN. REP. 13, 16 (1967); KASEP INDusrmus
AwN. REP. 33, 35 (1967). Reporting practices are discussed generally in
Hobgood, Voluntary Disclosure in 1967 Annual Reports, FANcrAL ExEcuTmIV,
June 1968, at 81.
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with this kind of report, might find it incomprehensible, or worse,
might be misled into thinking they understand something which they
do not, and thereby might draw unintended conclusions. The fact
that management, aware of the limitations of such statements, is
able to make internal use of them does not mean that investors,
who are not steeped in the company's affairs, can make similar use.
4 9
Moreover, different companies will exclude different kinds of costs in
arriving at a "defined profit" and comparability between companies
might be hindered. Still, a report of "defined profits" would add use-
ful information to the marketplace, if properly understood, and
such understanding is likely to develop in time. However, "defined
profits" reporting is probably not, and should not be, the ultimate
goal sought.
Chairman Cohen testified before a Senate Subcommittee that the
Commission possesses sufficient authority under existing law to re-
quire the necessary disclosure. 0 This authority could be exercised
in several ways by amending any of the forms on which information
is presently furnished. Form S-i, 51 the basic registration form under
the Securities Act of 193352 and Form 10,53 the basic registration form
under the Securities Exchange Act of 193454 each require the follow-
ing information under the caption "Description of Business": 5
If the business consists of the production or distribution of different
kinds of products or the rendering of different kinds of services, indi-
cate, insofar as practicable, the relative importance of each product or
service or class pf similar products or services which contributed
15% or more to the gross volume of business done during the last
fiscal years.5 6
Companies registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act5 7 must
similarly disclose changes in the business on an annual basis on Form
49 Halvorson, Accounting Aspects of Conglomerate Reporting, 23 Bus.
LAW. 549 (1968).
50 Economic Concentration Hearings, pt. 5, at 1986 (1966).
51 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1968).
52 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964), formerly 48 Stat.
74 (1933) [hereinafter referred to in text as the 1933 Act].
53 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1968).
54 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964), formerly
48 Stat. 881 (1934) [hereinafter referred to in text as the 1934 Act].
55 Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11(c) Item (9) (1968); Form 10, 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.210 Item (3) (1968).
56 The statutory basis for Form S-1 is Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A
(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964), which requires disclosure of the "general char-
acter of the business actually transacted or to be transacted by the issuer."
Section 12(b) (1) (A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781
(b) (1) (A) (1964) requires the disclosure of the "organization, financial
structure and nature of the business."
57 Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781
(b) (1964), provides for the registration of securities which are listed on a
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10-K 58 unless they have communicated with their shareholders by a
proxy statement or an information statement, although comparable
information is not required on these forms. These companies must
also furnish their shareholders with annual reports, containing two-
year comparative profit and loss statements in substantially the form
filed with the SEC on Form 10-K.59
The registrant must also include a certified financial statement as
part of Form S-l, Form 10, Form 10-K, and in some cases Form 8-K,10
the monthly report under the 1934 Act of particularly significant
events, such as a significant acquisition.61 An uncertified semi-annual
profit and loss statement, in rudimentary form, must be filed on
Form 9-K.6 2 The SEC proxy rules require disclosure of financial in-
formation similar to that submitted on Form 10 whenever a merger
or acquisition is submitted to a vote of the shareholders. The in-
formation must be furnished with respect to each of the companies
involved in the transaction.3
The SEC's Regulation S-X,64 governing the content and prepara-
national securities exchange. Section 12 (g) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (Supp. 1967), provides for the registration of
a class of securities if the issuer's assets exceed $1,000,000 and the class of
securities is held of record by 500 or more persons.
58 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1968).
59 Annual reports are required of all companies registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964), since such
companies are subject to the proxy requirements of section 14 of the same act,
15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964), and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R.
240.14a-1 to 240.14a-103 (1968). Proxy rule 14a-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)
(1968), requires the furnishing of an annual report to shareholders. The con-
tents of the annual report are not prescribed, except that the financial state-
ments must generally conform to those filed with the Commission in the
annual report required by section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2) (1964), and an issuer which has not previously sub-
mitted an annual report to its shareholders under proxy rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-3 (1968), must describe the nature and scope of its business.
60 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1968).
61 Certified financial statements are also required in the following regis-
tration forms of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964): Form
S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1968) (commercial and industrial companies in the
development stage); Form S-4, 17 C.F.R. § 239.14 (1968) (closed-end invest-
ment companies); Form S-5, 17 C.F.R. § 239.15 (1968) (open-end investment
companies); Form S-7, 17 C.F.R. 239.26 (1968) (certain large listed companies);
Form S-8, 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (1968) (employee offerings); Form S-9, 25 Fed.
Reg. 6431 (1960) (non-convertible fixed interest debt securities); Form S-11,
17 C.F.R. § 239.18 (1968) (certain real estate companies); Form S-14, 24 Fed.
Reg. 5900 (1959) (securities acquired in a transaction exempt from regis-
tration under rule 133).
62 17 C.F.R. § 249.309 (1968) (filed as part of original document).
63 Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Items 14-15 (1968).
64 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to 210.12-41 (1968).
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tion of financial statements filed with the Commission,65 requires
that if income is derived from both sales and operating revenues, and
if either contributes 10 percent to the total, the separate contributions
of each category to gross income must be stated.60 Thus, some
allocation of sales and revenues is required presently, but not along
lines which would reveal net income of separate product lines.67
This look at the requirements of financial statements, as well as
the requirements of prospectuses and annual reports, is important
because the Commission is not overlooking the possibility of extending
product line reporting to financial statements. Thus, Chairman
Cohen told the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee that:
Up to now, however, except in the case of companies selling both
goods and services, we have had no general requirement that con-
glomerate companies break down their financial statements to show
results of operations for their different divisions. As our 1965 mem-
orandum set forth, there are a number of reasons why we did not do
so. But, changes have been occurring recently which have made it
necessary for us to reconsider our requirements in this area despite the
difficulties we will have to face.68
Subsequently, Mr. Cohen told the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) that "if most of the net income came
from a product line which accounted for only half of the sales, I am
not sure that financial statements which do no more than report
sales, cost of sales, expenses and net income for the two divisions
'fairly present' the results of operations of the company for that
year."66 9
Before both the Senate Subcommittee and the AICPA, Mr. Co-
hen cited the recent English example of requiring companies en-
65 Except for Form 9-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.309 (1968); see rule 1.01 of Reg.
S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1968).
66 Rule 5.03 of Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-03 (1968).
67 The Securities Act of 1933 may have contemplated an allocation of
sorts, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 omits any reference to alloca-
tions. Schedule A(26) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964),
requires "a profit and loss statement of the issuer showing earnings and in-
come, the nature and source thereof .... ." Section 12(b) (1) (K) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1) (K) (1964) merely states
that there shall be filed "profit and loss statements for not more than the three
preceding fiscal years," which shall be certified if required by the Commission.
68 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 5, at 1987 (1966).
69 Address by Manuel F. Cohen to the 79th Annual Meeting of the
AICPA, Oct. 5, 1966, in J. AccouNTANcy, Dec. 1966, at 59 [hereinafter cited as
Cohen Address before the AICPA]. This is an important, if surprising, ob-
servation in view of the fact that thousands of financial statements have pur-
ported to "fairly present" the results of operations by reporting in the manner
Mr. Cohen now questions, and the SEC has not heretofore objected. But
changing times create changed needs and expectations, and the significance of
Mr. Cohen's questioning such an established practice may serve to emphasize
the strength of the Commission's feelings on this subject.
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gaged in substantially different kinds of businesses to describe sep-
arately the proportions into which sales are divided among the vari-
ous groups and the extent to which separate components have con-
tributed to profit or loss of the whole enterprise.70 Moreover, even
if the Commission initially does not require any changes in the finan-
cial statement, it may eventually do so. 1
All the forms which require either a description of the company's
business or a financial statement result from a statutory mandate to
the Commission to promulgate such forms.7 2 There exists sufficient
authority under these statutes to amend the forms so as to require
either a narrative presentation of the results of separate product line
groups or the inclusion of such results in a financial statement."
Moreover, the Commission could require that product line results be
certified by an independent accountant, or it could omit the require-
ment of certification, in whole or in part.74
There is also broad statutory authority given to the Securities
and Exchange Commission to prescribe accounting standards. Un-
der both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, the Commission has author-
ity to determine "the items or details to be included in the balance
sheet and earnings statement.175  For the most part the authority
has been unexercised 7 6 but this residual power could be employed
70 GUIDE TO THE ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COIMPANIES AcTS 1948-
1967, at 25 (1968) (published by Gee & Co., Ltd., London, for the General
Educational Trust of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales).
71 The research report of the National Association of Accountants argues
that investor confidence in reports of separate segments of a business will be
increased if buttressed by the auditor's opinion. The study suggests guidance
for coping with the difficulties concededly involved in such a recommendation.
M. BACKER & W. McFARLAND, ExTERNAi ACCOUNTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BusI-
NEss 101-02 (1968).
72 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Schedule A(8), (26), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g,
77j, 77aa Schedule A(8), (26) (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§
12(b) (1) (A), (K), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(b) (1) (A), (K) (1964).
73 Rule changes must comply with section 4(a) of the Adminsitrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-11 (1964), formerly 60 Stat. 237 (1945), which
requires notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity for interested parties
to be heard. See SEC Rules of Practice IV(b), 17 C.F.R. § 201.4(b) (1968) as
to the type of notice required.
74 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has no requirement of certifica-
tion for the financial information furnished on Form 9-K, 25 Fed. Reg. 3552
(1960); Form S-10, 17 C.F.R. § 239.17 (1968) (oil and gas royalty interests);
Form S-12, 31 Fed. Reg. 7740 (1966) (American Depository Receipts); Form
S-13, 17 C.F.R. § 239.25 (1968) (voting trusts); Form 1-A, 23 Fed. Reg. 4455
(1958) (Regulation A offerings under the Securities Act of 1933).
75 Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1964).
76 See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.1 (rev.
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to require product line reporting in financial statements filed with
the SEC. 7
Effect of Product Line Reporting on Compliance with
Securities Laws
The burden of compliance with any new standards imposed b-
the Commission will fall on both registrant corporations and their
auditors. How great this burden would be depends, of course, on the
content of any new rule. At a minimum, registrants and accountants
would be required to decide whether product line reporting was ap-
plicable to them at all, which product lines should be separately
shown and how the results should be described. Since the SEC is
charged with assuring compliance with any changes in existing rules,
its means of enforcing compliance should be examined.
The Commission has authority under the 1933 Act to issue a stop
order if it "appears to the Commission at any time that the registra-
tion statement includes any untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statements therein not misleading."78 If, for exam-
ple, Item 9 of Form S-179 were amended to require certain companies
to indicate sales and income by product lines, a stop order could be
issued if the company erroneously (in the Commission's view) decided
that the provision was inapplicable.8 0 Of course, the Commission does
not proceed in that manner, since deficiencies and alleged deficiencies
normally are discussed and cured informally by means of a letter of
comment and amendment.8 1 Nonetheless, the Commission's power to
take the matter to a formal proceeding could be used to compel
registrants to produce the additional data. Of course, this assumes
that the report of product line results would constitute a "material"
fact, which indeed seems to be the thrust of the Commission's view,
provided that either the sales or profits (or losses) of the separate
2d ed. 1966). Mr. Rappaport also says that the SEC may be asserting its
authority even over financial statements not filed with the Commission Id.
§ 23.13.
77 This might cause annual reports which are furnished to shareholders,
and which are not filed with the Commission, to show product line results,
since the financial information contained in the annual report must conform
essentially to the financial statements which are filed with the Commission on
Form 10-K, or the differences must be noted and explained. Proxy rule 14a-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2) (1968).
78 Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964).
79 17 C.F.R. § 239.11(c) Item 9 (1968) ('Description of Business").
80 The Commission's staff frequently has interpreted Item 9 to require
sales and earnings information on a product line basis. Most registrants
voluntarily comply.
81 1 L. LOSS, SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION 272-77 (2d ed. 1961).
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product line were of sufficient magnitude.8 2
Assume, however, that the registrant agrees to show results of its
separate product lines or divisions, but in a manner at variance with
the views of the Commission staff. Or assume that its allocation of
joint costs differs from the view taken by the Staff. The ground in
this area is largely untrod. Enough has been said by accountants and
corporate executives to demonstrate the wide and difficult areas of
judgment involved in such breakdowns and allocations.83 There
exist at present few guidelines to assist in making these judgments.
Conceivably the Commission might exercise its power to provide
fixed rules, although this would be a departure from past and
current practices.84 Failing that, reasonable judgments by registrants
would seem sufficient to avoid a stop order.85
If the Staff could use the threat of a stop order to compel product
line reporting, it is fair to ask whether it is likely that it would em-
ploy the same threat to compel breakdowns and allocations in a man-
ner favored by the Staff. In fact, this would seem to be unlikely.
It is one thing to tell a company that more information is required
and quite another to dictate the contents of the disclosure. It is
presumed that the Commission and the Staff, both acting in good faith,
would not insist upon one way to do something when there are
clearly tenable alternatives.8 6 This would be a still more radical
departure from past and current practice.87
82 See testimony of Manuel F. Cohen before the Economic Concentration
Hearings, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 1988 (1966).
83 Greer, The Chop Suey Caper, J. AccoUNTANcy, Apr. 1965, at 27; Hal-
vorson, Accounting Aspects of Conglomerate Reporting, 23 Bus. LAW. 549
(1968).
84 Cohen Address before the AICPA, supra note 69, at 56.
85 Wide latitude to management in making the difficult choices was sug-
gested as the proper SEC stance by Dr. Blair, the chief economist to the Sen-
ate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, on the occasion of Chairman
Cohen's testimony. Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 17, pt. 5, at
1991 (1966). The need for flexibility is urged strongly in Mautz, Bases for
More Detailed Reporting by Diversified Companies, Frm~Acu ExEcurv, Nov.
1967, at 52, 60. Flexibility seems, at this point, to have been accepted by the
SEC. Barr, Comments on the Conglomerate Reporting Problem, FIqNcIAL
EXEcuTIVE, Nov. 1967, at 39.
86 MAuTz ch. 2; see Sprouse, Chop Suey, Chain Stores and Conglomerate
Reporting, J. AccouNTANcy, Apr. 1968, at 35.
87 See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Releases [Acct. Ser. Rel.] No. 96 (Jan.
10, 1963), where the Commission says: "In recognition of the substantial di-
versity of opinion which exists among responsible persons in the matter of
accounting for the investment credit, the Commission will accept either
a method which reflects the investment credit in income over the produc-
tive life of the acquired property or a method which reflects 48% of the
investment credit (the maximum extent to which the credit can normally in-
crease net income) in income as a reduction of the tax expense of the year-in
The Commission's power to compel compliance with the 1934 Act
reporting requirements stems primarily from its power to suspend
trading in a company's security. The exercise of this power is condi-
tioned upon a determination by the Commission that "the public inter-
est so requires"8 8 in the case of listed securities and that "the public
interest and the protection of investors so require" in the case of a
security traded over-the-counter. 9 The suspension is for a maximum
of 10 days, but the order of suspension can be renewed every 10 days
indefinitely.9 0 The Commission has made increased use of this power
since 1964, when it was extended to over-the-counter securities.9 1
While the statutory standard is vague, the principal cause for a sus-
pension of trading has been the inadequacy of the information pro-
vided on Forms 10-K and 8-K filed with the Commission. Hence, if the
Commission required product line reporting, and if a report filed with
the Commission failed to comply with the requirements, the Commis-
sion could compel the filing of an amended report by suspending trad-
ing until such a report was filed.
The Commission has always been particularly concerned with the
contents of financial statements. It has held that financial statements
will be "presumed to be misleading" if they are prepared "in accord-
ance with accounting principles for which there is no substantial
authoritative support."92  Thus, if either as a result of SEC require-
ments or of voluntary decision, the breakdowns and allocations re-
lating to product line reporting were to appear in a company's finan-
cial statement, this concern would make it incumbent upon both the
registrant and the auditor to make judgments for which a reason-
able basis would be required.
What constitutes such "substantial authoritative support" is un-
clear.98  But it is clear that reliance on a current practice or custom
which the credit arises and defers the balance of 52% to subsequent accounting
periods during which depreciation allowances for tax purposes are reduced
because the statutory requirement reduces the basis of the property for tax
purposes by the amount of the investment credit .... In all cases full
disclosure of the method of accounting followed and amounts involved should
be made where material."
88 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4)
(1964).
89 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5)
(1964).
90 For example, trading in Westec stock on the American Stock Exchange
has been suspended since August 29, 1966. SEC Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Release No. 7945 (Aug. 29, 1966).
91 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5)
(1964).
02 SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 4 (Apr. 25, 1938).
93 L. RAPPAPORT. SEC AccouNTING PRA C E AND PROCEDURE § 2.7 (rev. 2d
ed. 1966).
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that the Commission deems inadequate lacks "substantial authorita-
tive support."'94 A certifying accountant who so places his reliance
incurs the risk of disciplinary proceeding under Rule II (e) of the Com-
mission's rules of practice.9 5 Hence, the extension of product line re-
porting into the company's financial statements is likely to spur the
accounting profession toward the development of generally accepted
accounting principles dealing with breakdowns of product lines and
allocation of costs.
Although there are at present no authoritative guidelines for re-
porting product line results,96 some standards do exist,917 and work
apparently is progressing toward the development of the necessary
understanding and skill.98 One accountant has written: "The kind
of product-line information needed for external reporting is gener-
ally accumulated anyway for managerial purposes. Depending upon
internal accounting procedures, disclosure may require some reclas-
sification but will not entail substantial effort or outlay." 99
That view is not representative of the accounting profession,
however.10 0 While it is probably true that product line information
is prepared for management, those readers of such a report have a
sophistication about the company's affairs which outside investors
could not hope to emulate. Consequently, management reads the re-
port with sharp awareness of its arbitrary aspects and its limita-
tions. It must be acknowledged, therefore, that much effort must still
be expended before guidelines can be produced which will assist in
the preparation of a report of comparable usefulness to the general
public. This effort has been spurred by the special report of the
Accounting Principles Board, which recognizes the usefulness of the
94 Interstate Hosiery Mills, 4 S.E.C. 706 (1939); In re McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc., SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940); see Note, Accountants' Lia-
bilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 1437,
1460 (1967).
95 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1968).
96 Rappaport, Problems in Product Line Reporting, 48 LYBRAND J. 1, 7
(1967).
97 The chairman of the AICPA's special committee to study product line
reporting has written that management has developed cost techniques to en-
able it to judge relative profitability of products, and consequently charge
each division with its share of overall joint costs. Bows, Problems in Dis-
closure of Segments of Conglomerate Companies, J. AccoUNTANcy, Dec. 1966,
at 33, 35.
98 See Mautz, Identification of the Conglomerate Company, FAcm
ExEcuTivE, July 1967, at 18; Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend or
Foe?, 22 Bus. LAw. 317 (1967).
99 Schachner, Corporate Diversification and Financial Reporting, J. Ac-
COuNTANcY, Apr. 1967, at 43, 50.
100 The AICPA committee appointed to study the project disagrees with
Professor Schachner. Heimbrucher Letter, supra note 44, at 3.
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information and urges companies voluntarily to disclose supplemental
financial information as to industry segments of the business.101
Despite the serious nature of the administrative sanctions at
the SEC's command, the risks of seeking to comply with product line
reporting requirements do not seem severe; at least they should not
seriously be increased. Registrants and accountants must develop
further their skills in making meaningful breakdowns of product lines
and allocations of joint costs to suit the particular needs of investors.
But the increased incidence of diversified companies, more than any
new SEC rules, will necessarily accelerate this development.
Product line reporting constitutes the adoption of a general rule
or a general policy requiring disclosure of information which may
adversely affect a company. The argument has been made that prod-
uct line reporting will, in fact, adversely affect reporting companies
with respect to competitors and customers, since some information,
currently confidential, might be included within the required dis-
closure. 102 The 1934 Act currently contains a provision which, if
utilized, could avoid such harm by allowing confidential disclosure
of information. 10 3
Confidential treatment should be granted in appropriate cases,
where the registrant can demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
harm. 0 4 The Commission previously has rejected an application for
confidential treatment of sales and profits of a single product com-
pany, as noted earlier, 105 and that position was affirmed in court.00
However, the court observed that the Commission sought the report-
ing of this information solely on the basis of the facts presented to
it. The court added that if the Commission had sought justification
of its position as a general rule or a general policy, "the case would
have been different and would have demanded different treat-
ment."107
The remarks of the Court of Appeals might well serve as a cau-
tion to the Commission that such applications should be viewed sym-
pathetically. The fact remains, however, that the Commission always
has been chary in granting applications for confidential treatment,
and there is little reason to expect liberal treatment in this area.
It should further be observed that confidential treatment of mat-
101 Accounting Principles Board Disclosure of Supplemental Financial
Information by Diversified Companies, J. AccouNTANcy, Oct. 1967, at 51.
102 Rappaport, Problems in Product Line Reporting, 48 LYBRAND J. 1, 6
(1967).
103 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b) (1964).
104 MAuTz, supra note 19, at 73, 142.
105 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
106 American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 110 F.2d 117 (D:C. Cir. 1940).
107 Id. at 121.
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ters contained in a financial statement or in the text of a document
setting forth product line results can be sought only with respect to
matters filed under the 1934 Act. Companies offering their securities
pursuant to a 1933 Act registration statement can seek confidential
treatment only for matters contained in a contract. 08
Civil Liabilities of Corporations and Their Personnel
The most serious implications of product line reporting are in the
area of potential civil liabilities of companies, their officers, directors
and controlling persons, and auditors. The problem of the corpora-
tion, its officers, directors and controlling persons will first be
considered.
Since their adoption, the Federal securities laws have been the
basis of most actions against corporations arising from the purchase
or sale of securities. A concept of "federal corporation law" has
emerged from these cases. Areas previously thought to be solely the
concern of state regulation have been brought within the scope of
federal law through the liability provisions of the federal securities
laws.109 In recent years this has been especially true, owing to the
proliferation of actions brought under rule 10b-5,10 promulgated
under the 1934 Act. To what extent, if at all, will product line re-
porting increase the hazards of liability?
The potential liability of corporations will be: (1) to those per-
sons who acquire securities from the company directly and those who
acquire securities sold pursuant to a 1933 Act registration statement,
(2) to persons who purchase or sell securities in the marketplace from
other investors, and (3) to shareholders. Both specific statutory lia-
bility provisions and implied but well recognized"' remedies must be
considered.
Liability to Purchasers
Insofar as the potential liability to purchasers under a registra-
tion statement is concerned, the specifically applicable statute is sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act. 12  This section renders the issuer liable to
any person who acquires such security if the registration statement
108 15 U.S.C. § 77aa Schedule A(30) (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 230.485 (1968).
109 Katz & Schwartz, Civil Liabilities Under Rule 10b-5, in DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS OF PUmic CoMPANIEs ND INsIDERS 302 (J. Flom, B. Garfinkel,
& J. Freund eds. 1967); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment,
78 Hs v. L. Rzv. 1146 (1965).
110 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
111 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); cf.
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
112 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
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contained "an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading . . ." The liability may arise in
a transaction in which the company is the seller, or in a secondary
distribution. Liability also extends to persons who signed the regis-
tration statement (which include the principal executive and finan-
cial officers), all directors, the underwriters and experts, and by vir-
tue of section 15,113 controlling persons. There are, however, cer-
tain defenses against liability which are available to all these persons
except the issuer."4
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act 15 is not limited to securities sold
under the registration statement, as is section 11. Section 12(2)
makes the seller liable to any person purchasing securities from it,
if a representation is made "which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading ......
In the context of a corporation's liability resulting from product
line reporting, section 11 is more pertinent than section 12(2). The
time of delivery of a prospectus is the only time at which the com-
pany is likely to make direct representations when it sells its securi-
ties. Most misrepresentations by corporations are likely to be made
indirectly, through the required registration statement. Since section
11, which is stricter than section 12 (2), is applicable to the registration
statement situation, recourse should be under that provision. Open
market transactions, on the other hand, normally will not involve the
company as a representing party, and since section 12(2) liability
is limited by a privity requirement, difficulties in this context gener-
ally will not arise. Of course, in the case of a privately negotiated
sale exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act,1 6
section 12(2), and not section 11, would then be applicable, thereby
covering any representations made in a private contract.
Product line reporting will require some companies to disclose
more than they are now disclosing. Since there is a risk that they
will misstate the required information, their chances of incurring
liability will be increased. The issuer who deliberately misstates the
information is not really of concern in this context. Such an issuer
will be subject to liability under either common law or federal law 17
if a misstatement relates to a material fact. Thus, this discussion is
113 Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
"14 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964).
115 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
116 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964).
17 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
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concerned with the issuer whose misstatement has resulted from in-
advertence or mistake, and whose liability will depend on the ma-
teriality of that misstatement.
One of the primary objections to product line reporting is that the
information to be furnished is not material, since the investor ac-
quires a stake only in the entire company." 8 But the argument that
results of separate product lines are not material, even though their
filing may be required, is not likely to prevail. As observed earlier,
a considerable benefit may accrue to an investor who knows the net
profits and profit margins of separate components of the business, as
this knowledge helps him to forecast the future performance of the
company." 9 Moreover, this knowledge assists the investor in evalu-
ating management's performance-possibly the most important in-
vestment variable.120
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
held that when a company's year-end earnings were accurately pre-
sented, but the results of recent months were inflated, a situation
which created the false impression of a favorable trend, a material
misstatement had been made.' 2 ' The Court said: "Concededly, the
profits for the year as a whole were substantially unaffected by the
overstatement of December earnings, but the prospective purchaser
was entitled to a full disclosure of all the facts that were known to
the Corporation at the time the prospectus was issued .... ,,122
A similarly prejudicial distortion of the financial condition of a
conglomerate company could result from an exaggeration of the earn-
ings reported for one product line, for example, and an understate-
ment of the earnings of another product line. The courts probably
will be inclined to view that type of distortion as being equally as
objectionable as the misreporting of recent operations. Thus, product
line results, if required, will in some cases, and perhaps in most, be
viewed as material; and liability could result notwithstanding the
accuracy of the aggregate profit figure.
23
I's See Rappaport, The Role of the Accountant, in DISCLOSURE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF CORPORATIONS AND INSIDERS 263-64 (J. Flom, B. Garfinkel & J. Freund
eds. 1967).
119 See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
120 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 21, 1964).
121 Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952).
122 Id. at 843.
123 "The term 'material,' when used to qualify a requirement for the fur-
nishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to
those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to
be informed before purchasing the security registered." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1)
(1968). What constitutes such information is "a question of judgment to be
exercised by the trier of fact as best he can in the light of all the circum-
stances." Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
To hold that results of a separate product line are a material
fact, however, does not by itself present any great peril to the cor-
poration. The computation and reporting of a "defined profit" will
not be a particularly burdensome task, although there are some prob-
lems, such as those arising from intra-company sales.124 Thus, if no
allocation of joint costs is required or volunteered, the fair presenta-
tion of product line results alone should be no cause for fear of in-
creased civil liabilities.
If allocations of joint costs are required, there is a greater mar-
gin for error. But it can be assumed that the basis of such alloca-
tions will be set forth in the report, as is the current practice.125 If
there is a rational basis for the method chosen, and if the method
fairly presents the true financial position of the company, it generally
could not be argued that the allegedly offending document fails to
make full disclosure. 2  There would seem to be no omission of a
material fact, no failure to state a material fact required to be stated,
and no untrue statement of a material fact, as those terms are used
in sections 11 and 12(2).
For the same reasons, common law rescission would not be
available.12 7  Certainly under the circumstances described, there is
no fraud at common law, as the essential element of scienter is
lacking. 2 8
In addition, liability is unlikely to be imposed under rule 10b-5.
It seems anomalous to permit buyers to bring an action based on a
false or misleading registration statement, or a false or misleading
representation in another context, under the implied liabilities of
rule 10b-5, when there are specified remedies available in the statute
for the identical transaction. 29 Wile this anomaly has been per-
mitted,' 80 the Second Circuit, where most of the cases have arisen,
has conditioned recovery under rule 10b-5 upon a showing of reli-
124 Halvorson, Accounting Aspects of Conglomerate Reporting, 23 Bus.
LAW. 549, 555 (1968). The objection to the use of "defined profit" is not with
the difficulty in computation, but with the difficulty an investor will have in
comprehending its meaning, and with its potentiality for confusion. Rappa-
port, Problems in Product Line Reporting, 48 LYBRAND . 1 (1967).
125 Bows, Problems in Disclosure of Segments of Conglomerate Companies,
J. ACCOUNTANCY, Dec. 1966, at 33; Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend
or Foe?, 22 Bus. LAW. 317, 321-22 (1967).
126 See, e.g., the treatment of the different methods of reporting the in-
vestment credit in SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 96 (Jan. 10, 1963).
127 3 L. Loss, SEcuaRTIEs REGULATiON 1627 (2d ed. 1961).
128 W. PRossE, LAw oF TORTs 700, 715-16 (3d ed. 1964).
129 Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. ]MI. 1967); 3 L.
Loss, supra note 127, at 1778-92.
180 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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ance
13 1 and scienter.13 2
Nonetheless, the celebrated Texas Gulf Sulphur case,'13 while
not involving a civil action for damages, suggested that scienter, in
its common law sense, was not required for recovery.134 Instead, the
rule was said to impose a standard encompassing negligence as well
as active fraud. The court said that the rule preserves the standard
sometimes referred to as "fraud," which includes what are variously
termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud or unreasonable or negli-
gent conduct.'1 5 But even under such an expansive view of what
constitutes actionable misconduct, it seems unlikely that a corpora-
tion and its managers who present product line information and allo-
cate joint costs, fully disclosing what they are doing and why, will
be exposed to any real danger of liability under rule 10b-5.
Further, as regards section 11, although the issuer's liability is
without regard to scienter and generally without regard to reli-
ance,13 6 liability is not so strictly imposed upon other persons under
11 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965). Reliance may be a plastic concept, however, since an allega-
tion of fraud under rule 10b-5 seems to permit shareholders to sue derivatively
on the basis of a failure to disclose material facts to shareholders, even though
the corporate act did not require shareholder approval. See Entel v. Allen,
270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This eliminates the need for "deception" in
the conventional sense. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 292, 267
(7th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967). Another
view is that deception is still an indispensable element of the violation, but in
some instances the knowledge of directors will not be imputed to the corpo-
ration, as in the case of a conflict of interests by a majority of the board.
Although the corporate activity in question does not require shareholder ap-
proval and can be approved by the board acting alone, disclosure to the board
alone will not suffice and, absent disclosure to shareholders, the corporation
will have been deceived. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,218 (2d Cir., May 29, 1968). Moreover, since a violation may occur
where there is total non-disclosure, it may be that reliance in such a situation
is deemed to have been placed on the adequacy of the state of information
generally known.
132 Fischman v. Raytheon MIfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Weber
v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Contra, Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in Private
Suits Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MicH. L. REv. 1070 (1965).
'33 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 92,251 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968).
134 Others have noted that scienter has come to mean nothing more than
negligence. A. BROBMERG, SEcuRiEs LAw: FRA UD-SEC RULE 10b-5 (1968).
135 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,251, at
97,183, 97,187 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968); see Comment, The Prospects for Rule
X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950) (section 106 provided no affirmative defense).
136 But see Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964), where
it is set forth that a showing of reliance is necessary where an issuer, subse-
quent to the issuance of a registration statement containing a material nis-
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this section. Controlling persons can avoid liability by showing that
they made a reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds to
believe, and did believe, that there was no untruth or misleading
statement in the registration statement.1 37 If the alleged defect was
purported to be made by an expert other than the officers or directors
(such as by an accountant) they may avoid liability by showing that
they had no reasonable ground to believe, and did not believe, that
there was any untruth or misleading statement in the registration
statement, 8 or that the statement did not fairly represent the
statement of the expert. 139 These defenses, and the defenses in sec-
tion 12(2) which provide for the avoidance of liability in the event
that the defendant did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable
care, could not have known of the untruth or omission, all of which
are in the nature of good faith defenses, should afford protection in
the circumstances described.
The defendant directors in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corpo-
ration,40 however, were denied the due diligence defenses of section
11 when they accepted without question or investigation the assur-
ances of management that the representations in the prospectus were
accurate and did not inquire as to specific statements. If a prospec-
tus makes allocations of joint costs, those who made the judgments
involved should be prepared to show that there is a basis for the choice,
but the other potentially liable persons should not be required to
determine independently whether the basis is reasonable. Of course,
if other information which they possess, or should possess, would
demonstrate that the choice is unreasonable, they should be held
accountable. The BarChris case has caused much soul searching in
the financial community.141 Nonetheless, that portion of the prospec-
tus in which joint costs are allocated, dealing as it does with the
interpretation of facts rather than with the presentation of raw data,
would appear to be one of the least troublesome to potential defend-
ants.
Some problems remain, stemming from the lack of uniformity
that may result following a requirement of product line reporting.
There is an obligation, of course, that the company's operating re-
sults be fairly presented in the report or in the text of a prospectus.
The selection of the proper method for reporting should be chosen
statement, makes available an earnings statement covering at least 12 months
beginning after the date of the registration statement.
137 Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
188 Securities Act of 1933 § llb(3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1964).
139 Securities Act of 1933 § llb(3) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (C) (1964).
140 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
141 The American Bar Association conducted a two day symposium de-
voted exclusively to consideration of the case in New York, Sept. 27-28, 1968.
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with this obligation clearly in mind. Increased effort has been exerted
in recent years to produce greater uniformity in accounting methods
in order to reduce confusion and increase comparability. 142 Adher-
ence to uniform methods probably would reduce the risks of lia-
bility as well.
Product line reporting, at least in its early stages, will be a step
toward greater diversity and away from uniformity. This diversity
has not, by itself, been a hazard to reporting companies, but caution
must be exercised. A method of reporting, proper under some cir-
cumstances but selected with the intent to obfuscate, could result
in liability. 143
Liability to Persons in the Marketplace
The second source of potential liability of the company and its
managers is to persons in the marketplace generally. Product line
reporting would furnish information not only in those transactions
to which the company is a party, as discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, but also in open market transactions between parties not neces-
sarily connected with the initial sale. It could be expected, therefore,
that the Commission would require product line results to be "filed"
with the Commission in the Company's registration statement under
the 1934 Act on Form 10144 and in its annual reports on Form 10-K.14'
Defective Reporting
The information reported on these forms is intended for use in
the marketplace, and the company is subject to potential civil lia-
bility under section 18 of the 1934 Act146 for any statement which is
"false or misleading with respect to any material fact" contained in
a document filed with the Commission, without regard to whether it
was a buyer or seller of securities. Potential defendants under this
section include also any person who makes, or causes to be made,
142 Flynn, Uniformity in Financial Accounting: A Progress Report, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 623 (1965).
143 Professor Bradley has asked, "do not the company and the auditor
fraudulently lead the reader into error when the facts presented to him for
his analysis can be fully expected, and indeed are designed, to convey an im-
pression that is inadequate and unreliable and when the true significance is
impossible to capture without painstaking explanation? Even conservative
courts may soon be persuaded that management and auditor ought to be held
accountable where this characterization of their conduct proves apt." Bradley,
supra note 13, at 911.
144 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1968).
145 17 C.F.R. § 239.310 (1968). Results on anything except an annual basis
might be extremely difficult to prepare and would be of minimal value;
hence no interim reports are likely to be sought.
146 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
false or misleading statements. In addition, controlling persons may
be liable unless they acted in good faith and did not induce the
acts constituting a violation. 147
Section 18 is probably the most unavailable of all the liability
provisions in the federal securities laws. A recital of the requisites
for liability makes it clear why there has never been a successful
recovery under the statute. The plaintiff must show that he relied on
the alleged false or misleading statement and that his reliance was
the cause of his damage. Moreover, all defendants can avail them-
selves of the defense of good faith and lack of knowledge of the false
or misleading character of the statement. Thus, it would appear
even more likely than under the 1933 Act that a separate product line
report which disclosed the basis upon which it was prepared would
not be subject to liability under section 18 of the 1934 Act.
Plaintiffs may seek to avoid the burdens of section 18 by suing
under rule 10b-5. Again, as in the case of liability for statements in
a 1933 Act registration statement, it is not clear whether a false or
misleading statement contained in a document filed with the Commis-
sion and potentially the basis for liability under section 18 entails the
risk of liability under rule l0b-5, and no court has ruled on the ques-
tion.1- 8 In fact, rule 10b-5 more closely resembles section 18 than
it does section 11 of the 1933 Act, and the anomaly of dual remedies
is even more striking. Even if rule 10b-5 is available, however, no
recovery under the circumstances hypothesized should be available, as
there would seem to be a full disclosure and a lack of scienter.
Omission to Report
It has been assumed that the companies required to show product
line results will recognize the need to comply and will honestly at-
tempt to do so. But the obligation to report may not always be
clearly recognizable. Thus, a company's failure to show any results
of separate product lines must be considered. It is more realistic
to imagine this situation in a context other than that of a public of-
fering by a company under the 1933 Act, where the SEC staff al-
ways carefully examines the filing. Filings under the 1934 Act do
not receive the same attention as do 1933 Act filings,149 and the
omission of product line reporting may more easily escape detection.
Section 18 liability potentially exists in these circumstances, but
recovery would be difficult for the reasons mentioned above. Rule
147 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20a, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1964).
148 The issue was raised, but not resolved. Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 869 (1967) (remarks of Professor
Jennings).
149 Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HAuv. L. REv. 1340, 1353
(1966).
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10b-5, however, contains fewer obstacles to recovery. An investor
might thus seek recovery against the corporation for a failure to re-
port by product lines where such omission was material and there
existed a duty to disclose.
Would the existence of the reporting requirement increase the
risk that the corporation, by remaining silent, would be failing in its
duty to investors? The contours of rule 10b-5 are not firmly fixed,
but certain observations can be made. The rule is limited to conduct
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, though this limi-
tation has been construed broadly. 50 In cases where neither the
company, nor its insiders, nor anyone whom the company is aiding or
abetting' 51 is engaged in the purchase or sale of securities, rule
10b-5 has not yet been extended so far as to render a company liable
in damages for its silence or even for misrepresentation, although
injunctive relief has been granted.152
Thus, a requirement of product line reporting would not seem to
affect the liability of the company whose activities merely affect mar-
ket transactions, particularly since due diligence and good faith are
150 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. f 92,251 (2d
Cir., Aug. 13, 1968). The early cases restricted action to buyers or sellers, but
the rule may now have broader applicability. The law in this area is con-
fusing, and the early somewhat rigid approach was recently reasserted, after
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., supra, in Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F. Supp. 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 92,262 (2d Cir., Aug. 30, 1968).
In Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., supra, the SEC asked the court to rule that
a plaintiff need only be a person whose stock lost value as a result of the vio-
lation, but the court found no need to rule on this point. 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d
Cir. 1967).
151 Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
152 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 1 92,251 (2d
Cir., Aug. 13, 1968). Conduct may be violative of the rule without the defend-
ant having been engaged in securities transactions. Id. at 97,187. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the company did not remain silent, but issued a press release
alleged to have been false and misleading. Injunctive relief was sought. Id.
at 97,185.
Conduct violative of the rule has resulted in an injunction, although dam-
ages were denied where the company was neither purchaser nor seller. Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Heit v.
Weitzen, No. 31157 (2d Cir., Oct. 3, 1968) (Medina, J.), where the corporate
defendant had not engaged in buying or selling, but had issued a statement
which had market impact. The plaintiff sought damages under rule 10b-5 for
misrepresentation, and the court, on appeal from the granting of the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss, reversed and remanded.
The SEC to date has not alleged that total silence by a corporation which
is neither buying nor selling securities violates rule 10b-5. Moreover, omis-
sion of product line results from a published report may not constitute "total
silence."
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relevant to the question of a company's violation of rule 10b-5.153
When a company is neither totally silent in omitting product line
information from a report or statement nor actively engaged in mar-
ket activities, directly or indirectly, the possibility of liability under
rule 10b-5 would appear remote. The plaintiff in such a case would
shoulder the heavy burden of proving both lack of due diligence in a
matter involving judgment and the effect of the defendant's omis-
sions on the market. 5 4 He therefore would be unlikely to succeed
except in the most extreme case of disregard for fair and just finan-
cial reporting.
On the other hand, the obligation of the corporation and its
insiders to disclose material facts on those occasions when they do
trade in the company's securities exists apart from any requirement
to file prescribed information with the Commission.155 Certainly it
should not come as a shock if a court were to find that product line
reporting in a given case was such a material fact, whether or not
the SEC had adopted any rule changes.156 Nonetheless, the likeli-
hood of a finding that product line reporting constitutes a material
fact would be increased if the SEC compelled the furnishing of the
information on any of its forms. Therefore, the problem of liability
under rule 10b-5 does present perhaps the most serious liability ques-
tion created by product line reporting. It suggests either that care-
ful guidelines, as explicit as the rules reasonably can be made, should
be adopted by the Commission and by the AICPA157 in order to
minimize the area of uncertainty surrounding the obligation to report
and the classification of reporting components, or that the stand-
ards be made sufficiently flexible to permit management to choose
safely between reasonable alternatives, as recommended by Professor
Mautz.158
153 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,251 (2d
Cir., Aug. 13, 1968).
154 Id.
155 Id.; Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
156 The closer the case, the less likely the fact of separate product lines
will be found material. Clearly, an electronics operation and a cement opera-
tion are separate product lines, and their separate results are likely to be
material facts. However, companies should have little difficulty in recogniz-
ing this fact and reporting separate operations. Whether different geograph-
ical operations constitute separate product lines is a harder question, but at
the same time, separate results of those operations are not as likely to be
material.
157 The Accounting Principles Board preliminary recommendations seem
to focus on "those segments of the business which are clearly separable into
different industry lines." AICPA, Disclosure of Supplemental Financial Infor-
mation by Diversified Companies, J. AccouNTANcy, Oct. 1967, at 51. This
standard, almost by definition, would obviate the recognition problem.
158 MAuTz, supra note 17, at 158.
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Liability to Shareholders
Thus far, we have considered the potential liability of corpora-
tions to investors. It is also necessary to see whether the corporation
is exposed to an increased threat of liability to its shareholders.
The proponents of product line reporting have spoken mainly of
its value to potential buyers and sellers of securities. But in fact, it
may play a role in proxy contests and in other matters submitted to a
vote of shareholders. In the case of a contest, the proxy statement
used by either party does not contain an item comparable to Item 9
of Form S-1 or Item 3 of Form 10, describing the company's busi-
ness.159 However, an annual report must be furnished to sharehold-
ers and the financial statements contained therein are expected to
conform basically to the financial statements filed with the Commis-
sion.16 0 Hence, if product line reporting is required in the Form 10-K
financial statements, the same information should be expected to be
given to shareholders. 6 ' Although the proxy rules require the dis-
tribution of the annual report to shareholders, the report is not con-
sidered "filed" for purposes of liability under section 18, nor is it
considered a solicitation subject to the proxy regulations. 0 2  As a
result, neither section 18 nor the proscription of rule 14a-9163 against
the inclusion of any false or misleading statement contained in a docu-
ment "subject to this regulation" and the implied civil liability under
that rule6 4 would apply to statements appearing in an annual re-
port.1
5
Statements contained in an annual report could cause possible
liability under rule 10b-5, but only in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, and hence not in an election contest.166 If man-
agement omits product line reporting in the annual report it dis-
tributes to shareholders during a proxy contest and thereby conceals
either its own inefficiency or some other reason to vote for the in-
surgents, no action could be maintained under federal law whereby
the election could be set aside. On the other hand, if the soliciting
:159 See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
160 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1968). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.141-3 (1968).
161 Even if the proxy rules did not require the inclusion of a product line
reporting in the annual report sent to shareholders, it seems likely that once
management was compelled to disclose it to the SEC, and thereby make the
information public, it would elect to include comparable information in the
report sent to shareholders. Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange would
be likely to require it of listed companies under these circumstances.
162 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (c) (1968).
163 Id. § 240.14a-9 (a).
164 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
165 Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
166 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Laws": An Assessment, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1146, 1157 (1965).
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material, 1 7 which unlike the annual report is subject to the regula-
tion,168 contained any false or misleading statements about product
line results, a federal claim would exist, as is the case at the present
time.169 Moreover, in an action brought under state rather than fed-
eral law, false or misleading statements in an election contest could
cause the setting aside of the election, 170 and a state court would
not be inhibited, as would the federal courts, by the fact that the
misrepresentation appeared in an annual report rather than in a docu-
ment labelled a proxy statement.
In certain other solicitations subject to the proxy rules, the
company is required to include financial information in the proxy
statement. If shareholders are asked to vote on the issuance of
securities, the modification or exchange of outstanding securities, or
a merger, consolidation, acquisition of another company or a dissolu-
tion of their own company, the company must furnish appropriate
financial statements in the proxy statement. 17' In any such transac-
tion, the proscription of rule 14a-9 and rule 10b-5172 would be ap-
plicable to any product line reporting that might be required in a
proxy statement or a financial statement. Further, if the registrant
company combines with another company, it must disclose in the text
of the proxy statement the nature of the business of the other com-
pany,38 which requirement might be amended to include product line
results.
As noted in connection with other documents, 1' however, a com-
pany which discloses the basis on which it reports will not face a
serious risk of liability. Although the greater danger is faced by the
company that omits any product line reporting for itself or the ac-
quired company, the likelihood that this omission would cause an
appreciably greater risk of liability than exists under present law
appears remote. What potential liability does exist would be imposed
in a derivative suit, based on violation of the Commission's rules,
against the corporate officers for damage to the corporation, rather
than in a suit against the corporation for damage to an individual
167 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1968).
168 Id. § 240.14a-9.
169 SEC v. Okin, 48 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); see E. ARANow & H.
EINoarn, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONROL 154 (2d ed. 1968).
170 Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
171 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A, Item 15 (1968) (financial state-
ments).
172 The enumerated transactions all appear to involve the purchase or sale
of securities. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
178 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A, Item 14(b) (1) (1968) (mergers,
consolidations, acquisitions and similar matters).
174 Text accompanying notes 125, 147 supra.
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shareholder. The plaintiffs in such a suit presumably would seek
to set aside the transaction and perhaps to recover damages from the
officers and directors for an improvident transaction. They might suc-
ceed if product line results, required or not, which were not made
available to shareholders, reflected the inexpediency of the transac-
tion. On the other hand, nondisclosure of the performance of prod-
uct lines might not be judged as affecting the decision-making of share-
holders. In that event, liability is not likely to be imposed even if
the omission contravenes a technical requirement that the informa-
tion be furnished. 75
But, as noted, product line reporting might disclose errors in judg-
ment of management. Thus, if an acquisition turned out badly, the
error would be revealed, whereas at present the performance of the
acquired company could be concealed. Or, product line reporting
could show a large loss in a developmental program and encourage
an action for waste.176 To the extent that product line reporting
poses a serious new threat1 77 to management from an increased inci-
dence of shareholders derivative suits, thereby deterring manage-
ment's venturesomeness, there may be a social loss.'78 But while
there is no way of knowing if there would be an increase in litigation,
there does not seem to be any real danger of increased liability.
Directors presently are required to exercise due care and diligence in
the discharge of their duties. They are not liable for losses due to
imprudence or honest errors of judgment. 7 9 The burden of proving
the lack of such care rests with the plaintiff, 8 0 who must also
show that the director's negligence was the cause of the loss.8 1 If,
'75 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
170 Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend or Foe?, 22 Bus. LAW. 317,
328 (1967). See G.E.'s Edsel, FORBES MAGAZINE Apr. 1, 1967, at 21.
'77 It is possible that under state law a shareholder could obtain such de-
tailed information. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 46 (1953).
378 One industry group indicates that this request would "inhibit the kind
of courage and risk taking by top management that is the very essence of both
corporate and national progress and in which the individual investor certainly
has a profound interest. The net effect of product-line reporting could be to
increase information for shaieholders but to reduce the profits in which they
are primarily interested." MACHI-E AND AL=i.n PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, ToP MAX-
AGEMENT LOOKS AT PRODUCT-LINE REPORTING 9 (1967). The pamphlet also
perceives "a great danger in too great a preoccupation with the interests of
the shareholder." It contends that management's responsibility embraces a
wider range, and includes concern for employees, customers, suppliers and the
public. The SEC's Chief Accountant found this last a "startling statement."
Barr, Comments on the Conglomerate Problem, FnANcIAL ExEcuTVE, Nov.
1967, at 39.
179 H. BALLANTIN, CoaRoRmTroNs § 63a (rev. ed. 1946).
180 Id. § 63b.
181 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). In a transaction re-
however, as a result of product line reporting, management exercises
greater care in important transactions, there would be a social gain.
Chairman Cohen has urged that such disclosure
serves as an important control on corporate managers by requiring
them to justify the results of their stewardship. There may be
diversified companies which are maintaining low-profit or money-
losing operations for reasons which would not be persuasive to stock-
holders or financial analysts and requiring separate disclosure might
well result in the improvement or elimination of the sub-standard
operation, to the ultimate benefit of the stockholders and the
economy generally. 8 2
One group has questioned whether management might be liable
in a shareholder's derivative suit for disclosing product line results
which are helpful to competitors. 83 This would appear to be a wholly
imaginary fear. It has not deterred a growing number of companies
from volunteering such information. The position of management is
vastly strengthened when such disclosure is made as a consequence
of a legal duty to do so; at that point management's risk becomes
that of failure to disclose. 84 As the SEC said of a fiduciary's duty:
"This relationship could not justify any actions by him contrary to
law."185
Liabilities of Accountants
Since the most difficult problems resulting from product line re-
porting are accounting problems, it is especially important to see how
the civil liabilities of accountants would be affected. In view of the
recent increase in lawsuits against accountants, 6 this examination
comes at an appropriate time.
The role of the independent accountant is central to the admin-
istration of the federal securities laws. Congress rejected a proposal
in 1933 for the review of financial statements of filing companies by
government auditors, in favor of certification by independent public
accountants.'8 7 The Commission has observed: "The responsibility of
quiring shareholder approval, it is difficult to see how the directors' negli-
gence can be the cause of the loss, provided, of course, that there is full
disclosure.
182 Cohen Address before the AICPA, supra note 69, at 59.
183 Letter from Committee on Corporate Reporting of Financial Executives
Institute to Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Sept. 16, 1966.
184 See also MAUTz, supra note 19, at 73; Sommer, Legal Aspects of the
Recommendations on Financial Reporting by Diversified Companies, in MOrrz
381.
185 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961). See also 3 W. FLTcnmR,
CYCLOPEDIA OF TE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1046 (1965). Professor
Scott says that a trustee is under no duty to violate the law or act contrary
to public policy. 2 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 165 (2d ed. 1956).
186 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
187 Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 127 (1933).
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a public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee, but also
to investors, creditors, and others who may rely on the financial
statement which he certifies."
8 8
It is not at all clear that independent accountants will be re-
quired to certify anything in connection with product line reporting;
in fact, the preliminary indication of the SEC to the AICPA was that
no certification would be required. 8 9 Yet, the problems which might
be encountered should be viewed under alternative assumptions. The
alternative means of product line reporting which could be required
of accountants would be: (1) A description of product line results in
the textual portion of a document, (2) information included in a
financial statement but not certified by accountants, and (3) informa-
tion included within a certified financial statement.
Common Law Liability
The common law development affords the background for exam-
ining accountants' liabilities. The leading case is Ultramares Corpora-
tion v. Touche.190 An accounting firm certified a financial statement
which listed fictitious assets. It was conceded that the accountants
were unaware of this fraud, but the plaintiff, a creditor of the subject
company, who had relied on the financial statement, charged that the
accountants were negligent in their audit and were so careless as to
be guilty of fraud. Judge Cardozo held that despite the jury finding
of negligence, the accounting firm was not liable on this count to the
plaintiff. Cardozo said that ordinary negligence could not render the
accounting firm liable to anyone except the party with which it had
contracted. Any change in this result, he said, would have to be
"wrought by legislation,"' 91 although he noted that the "assault on the
citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace."' 92
On the question of fraud, or constructive fraud, however, the
court held that the jury properly could impose liability in favor of the
creditors, as persons within the contemplated use of the financial
statement. A subsequent decision of the same court elaborated on
this point:
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even where
there is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation certified
as true to the knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there is
none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so
flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief in
its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to
see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently
18S Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957).
189 Heimbrucher Letter, supra note 44, at 4.
190 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
19' Id. at 187, 174 N.E. at 447.
192 Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
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gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to
impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance
sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of conse-
quence may take the place of deliberate intention.193
The privity requirement of the Ultramares case afforded account-
ants considerable protection from ordinary negligence. It is doubtful,
however, that the requirement remains in full force under common
law today. It seems more accurate to say that the common law lia-
bility of accountants "extends to those persons for whose guidance the
accountan prepares his report and for those transactions in which the
report was intended to be used."'1
94
Certainly, the common law liability of an accountant is based on
the fact that he certified the financial statement. 195 The language of
the certificate can limit the scope of this liability by clearly stating
that the accountant has not made his own examination, but is rely-
ing on the views of others, and that no opinion is expressed with
respect to a particular matter in the statement. 96 The financial state-
ments are, after all, the expressions of management, 97 and the audi-
tor's certificate does not of itself signify that the accountant has pre-
pared the statement or has made the judgments necessary for the
presentation of the company's financial position. 9 8 But financial
statements are expected to be prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles in order to narrow the range of choices
available to management and accountants and hence to make a com-
193 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.W. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-19
(1938).
194 Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Re-
ports, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 436, 447 (1964); see Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284
F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft
No. 12, 1966).
195 Accountants today do not "certify", they express an "opinion" regard-
ing the financial statement. Some courts, however, have disregarded the dif-
ference. Bradley, Auditors' Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 906 (1965). Throughout the
opinion in Fischer v. Kletz, 26 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), Judge Tyler
refers to the accountant's "certificate," although counsel for the accountant
had pointed out in its brief that no "certificate" had been given, but that
merely an "opinion" was expressed. PEvidently this observation was found to
be without significance. Brief for Defendants Peat, Marwick & Mitchell at 2
n.1, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Regulation S-X also
speaks of the auditor's opinion as a certificate. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (1968).
196 Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 24, 191 N.E. 808 (1934); C.I.T. Finan-
cial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Hedley, Byrne & Co.
v. Heller & Partners [1964] A.C. 465.
197 Hanson, Responsibility of Independent Public Accountants, 22 Bus.
LAw. 975 (1967).
198 O'Connor v. Ludlaw, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); Kountze v. Kennedy.
147 N.Y. 124, 41 N.E. 414 (1895).
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pany's statement more meaningful and more capable of comparison
with the reports of other companies. 199 If the report does not reflect
generally accepted accounting principles, the accountant may be lia-
ble if he gives an unqualified opinion.200 What may constitute a gen-
erally accepted accounting principle is a complex question, and the
burden may be on the plaintiff to prove what the applicable princi-
ples should be and what the statement should have contained.20 1
The striving for increased uniformity in generally accepted ac-
counting principles has been noted.20 2 The sources of generally ac-
cepted principles are numerous,20 3 but probably the most authorita-
tive source today is the Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the
AICPA. The objectives of the APB are:
(1) To advance the written expression of what constitutes generally
accepted accounting principles;
(2) To determine appropriate practice and to narrow the areas of
difference and inconsistency in practice; and
(3) To lead in the thinking on unsettled and controversial issues.20 4
To produce a degree of uniformity on specific issues, account-
ants are strongly urged by the APB to follow its opinions. The
Board has increased its activity recently in response to pressures for
uniformity, and has developed authoritative opinions in areas pre-
viously noted for their diversity. 20 5 It would be consistent with its
basic objectives for the APB to develop uniformity in product line
reporting as soon as the need for uniformity seems required. Apart
from other desirable results, this action would reduce the auditor's
risk of liability.
There would appear to be little threat of common law liability
to the accountant from a requirement of product line reporting. No
liability could be imposed unless the statement was certified, and
certification, as noted, is not within present contemplation.20 6 Even
if certification were required, the accountant could disclaim in the
certificate any opinion with respect to breakdown of product lines or
allocations of joint costs and obviate serious danger of liability other
than that resulting from a disregard of some generally accepted ac-
199 T. WIsE, THE IsiDERs ch. 2 (1962); FORBES MAGAZINE, May 15, 1967,
at 28.
200 Teich v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 749, 263 N.Y.S.2d
932 (1965).
201 Blank v. Kaitz, 350 Mass. 779, 216 N.E.2d 110 (1966).
202 See text accompanying notes 93-101 supra.
203 Bradley, Auditors' Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 899 (1965).
204 Sprouse & Vagts, The Accounting Principles Board and Differences and
Inconsistencies in Accounting Practice: An Interim Appraisal, 30 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 710 (1965).
205 Cohen Address before the AICPA, supra note 69, at 59.
206 See text accompanying note 189 supra.
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counting principle. And even if the statement failed to reflect product
line results when such results would be of material value to in-
vestors, such an omission would not appear to expose the accountant
to danger of common law liability unless some presently non-existent
generally accepted accounting principle, dictating such presenta-
tion, was ignored.207
The honest but erroneous exercise of judgment, especially in view
of the auditor's need to rely on management for its information,
would seem to preclude the finding of actual or constructive fraud
necessary for liability. Moreover, liability has not, as yet, been im-
posed upon accountants for failure to make a disclosure in the report
in situations involving the same difficult areas of judgment presented
in product line reporting.208 The somewhat solicitous attitude toward
accountants which the courts have displayed2 9 should prevent the
imposition of liability except for the most flagrant disregard of the
requirement that the earnings statement reflect product line results.
Thus, despite the fact that the pace of the assault on the citadel
of privity has quickened, the common law liability of accountants to
creditors and investors is still difficult to establish.210 Accountants
would face a genuine problem of liability only if the Commission in-
sisted on an unqualified certificate with respect to product line in-
formation. Given the above-mentioned considerations, this require-
ment would be unjustified, a conclusion reportedly shared by the
Commission.211
Liability Under Securities Statutes
One of the principal purposes of the federal securities laws was
to overcome many of the common law obstacles to civil liability in
securities transactions. 212 With the Ultramares case recently in the
207 See text accompanying notes 195-201 supra.
208 Cf. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
209 Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 3. Bus. LAW,
Apr. 1966, at 190-195.
210 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The English view of
the accountants' responsibility now goes at least as far as the Ultramares case
and may be even broader. See Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners
[1964] A.C. 465 (overruling rationale of Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.
[1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.)), noted in 77 HARv. L. REv. 773 (1964).
Moreover, the American view may be in the process of enlarging account-
ants' liabilities. The proposal in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (2)
(Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965) would extend liability to persons for whose benefit
the financial statement is intended, and thus, conceivably, would be for the
protection of investors. See Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Mis-
leading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1437 (1967).
211 Heimbrucher Letter, supra note 44, at 4.
212 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227
(1933).
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background, Congress extended the liability provisions of section 11
of the 1933 Act to certifying accountants. Liability is imposed if the
effective registration statement "contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.1
21 3
Unlike the issuer, however, the accountant may relieve himself of
liability if he can establish that he made a reasonable investigation
and had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that the
statements were true and that there was no omission of a material
fact.214
The effect of these provisions was summarized in an article co-
authored by one who later became chairman of the SEC, as follows"
To say the least, the Act goes as far in protection of purchasers of
securities as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully
urged the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a
creditor. The change which that court thought so "revolutionary" as
to be "wrought by legislation" has been made. And the duty placed
on experts such as accountants has not been measured by the expert's.
relation to his employer but by his service to investors.
215
The application of section 11, like that of the common law doc-
trines, is to statements which the accountant has "certified." The
SEC has recognized the special significance of a certified statement:
A certification is a material fact. It signifies that the contents of the
financial statements to which it is appended have been checked and
verified within the limits stated in the certificate. To make such
certification truly protective of the interests of security holders and
investors the requirement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,
is that it be made by an "independent public or certified account-
ant." The insistence of the Act on a certification by an "independent"
accountant signifies the real function which certification should per-
form. That function is the submission to an independent and im-
partial mind of the accounting practices and policies of registrants.
The history of finance well illustrates the importance and need for
submission to such impartial persons of the accounting practices and
policies of the management to the end that present and prospective
security holders will be protected against unsound accounting prac-
tices and procedure and will be afforded, as nearly as accounting
conventions will permit, the truth about the financial condition of the
enterprise which issues the securities. Accordingly, the certification
gives a minimum of protection against untruths and half-truths which
otherwise would more easily creep into financial statements. 216
An accountant who certifies a report filed with the Commission
under the 1934 Act is potentially liable under section 18 of that stat-
ute as a person who makes a statement appearing in a filed document.
213 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (4) (1964).
214 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (B)
(1964).
215 Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
198 (1933) (footnotes omitted).
216 Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S.E.C. 364, 367 (1936),
However, as noted earlier, that section, with its defenses of good
faith and no knowledge, has thus far been of no avail to anyone. 17
In addition, only two reported cases have dealt with accountants'
liability under section 11 of the 1933 Act, and in only one case
have accountants been held liable. However, it must be asked
whether the danger of such liability would be enhanced if certified
financial statements were required to show product line reporting.
Although the 1933 Act broadened the class of persons to whom ac-
countants were liable for a breach of the duty of ordinary care, the
statute did not make the accountant an insurer of the accuracy of
the company's financial statement, nor did it, as such, affect the man-
ner in which the accountant discharged his duty to use due care.
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation,218 where the ac-
countants were held liable under section 11, the court stated that
"[a] ccountants should not be held to a standard higher than that rec-
ognized in their profession. '21 9 The accountants were unable to show
that they had exercised due diligence in performing their audit, but
the case did not involve liability for a faulty exercise of judgment.
It thus does not seem particularly germane to the problems pre-
sented by product line reporting, except insofar as an accountant
might face liability for disregarding generally accepted accounting
principles or for abdicating his function in deference to the decisions
of management.
The other reported case under section 11 involving an ac-
countant is Shonts v. Hirliman.22 0 In that case, the accountant failed
to show in the balance sheet a lease obligation, which did not become
fixed and definite until after the date of the certificate. The court
held that no liability resulted from this failure, since the books of the
company did not show the lease, and the negotiated arrangement was
not called to the accountant's attention.221 Shonts v. Hirliman has
been criticized sharply by Professor Loss for accepting "surprisingly
low accounting standards. ' 222  He observed that "few reputable ac-
counting firms would be satisfied with a mere perusal of matters
coming to their attention through inspection of the books at .their
disposal. '223 BarChris impliedly accepts the more stringent standard
217 See text. accompanying notes 146-48 supra. It has been suggested that
this section is an adoption of the rule of Ultramares, and that accountants are
liable only for fraud. S. LEvy, AccouNTANTs' LEGAL REs ONsIBtITY 50 (1954).
218 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
219 Id. at 703.
220 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939). -
221 Id. at 483.
222 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1733 (2d ed. 1961).
223 Id. See also In re McKesson & Robbins, SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 19
(Dec. 5, 1940).
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in finding a lack of due diligence by accountants who discovered
danger signals but disregarded them.
224
If product line reporting resulted in an erroneous financial state-
ment, it is unlikely that the error would be such as to impose lia-
bility on an accountant acting in good faith.225 The sources of diffi-
culty in preparing such a financial statement are matters of judgment
which have not subjected accountants to liability at common law.220
Even if it is assumed that the Shonts case, especially in light of the
decisions in BarChris227 and McKesson & Robbin, 228 does not reflect
modern judicial attitudes toward auditor's duties, the auditor act-
ing in good faith must necessarily rely on many subjective assess-
ments made by others when he certifies a statement containing prod-
uct line results.
The SEC recognizes that the financial statement is management's
representation -22 9 and that the primary responsibility for its presenta-
tion belongs to management.230 The auditor must inquire of man-
agement as to the basis upon which product ine reporting has been
made (which basis, presumably, will be disclosed in the financial
statement) and see that the report constitutes a fair presentation.
Management, however, is ultimately responsible for the choice among
alternative accounting principles used in presenting the company's
financial position.23 ' If the accountant makes such inquiry, the de-
fenses available under section 11(b) 232 and section 18233 should pro-
tect him from liability. The accountant who certifies a statement
which improperly omits product line reporting incurs a lesser risk
than does the company itself. Of course, as generally accepted ac-
counting principles are developed with respect to product line report-
ing, including standards by which companies and accountants can
determine when product line results are required, the auditor must
224 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
225 As in the case of management, our concern is not with accountants
who seek to deceive. When the auditors join management in an effort to
deceive investors, they become part of the fraud and are liable. Bradley,
Auditors' Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting Uniformity, 30
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 906-07 (1965).
226 See text accompanying notes 208-11 supra.
227 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
228 In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 19 (Dec. 5,
1940).
229 SEC Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 62 (June 27, 1947).
230 Interstate Hosiery Mills Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 721 (1939).
231 Bradley, Auditors' Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 905 (1965).
232 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964).
233 Securities Exchange Act of 1934§ 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
face the risk of liability when he ignores such principles." 4
Regardless of the allocation of liability, a primary purpose of
product line reporting is to serve the needs of investors. Whether
or not the SEC adopts new rules, auditors must ask whether the
statements prepared by the management of a diversified company
fairly present that company's operating results and financial posi-
tion,28 5 especially in view of advantages management today claims for
diversification. If this need is recognized and filled by management
and by auditors, the auditor's risks of civil liability should not be
substantial.
Liability Under Rule 10b-5
A requirement that product line results be included in financial
statements does not mean necessarily that such results must be certi-
fied by independent accountants. If the Commission accepts presen-
tation of the results as supplemental information in the text of a
prospectus or a report, the provisions of section 11 and probably of
section 18 would be inapplicable to the accountant. The limited ap-
plicability of sections 11 and 18 to accountants' liability requires that
primary consideration be given to rule 10b-5. The liability asserted
by reason of an omission or a false or misleading statement in a certi-
fied statement shall first be considered.
Liability from Certified Statement
If the accountant knowingly participates in the preparation of a
materially false financial statement, liability exists under rule 10b-5,236
but this liability is not really an expansion of the risk resulting from
a requirement of product line reporting. If the accountant is unaware
of any deficiency in the statement, following the exercise of proper
accounting standards, the likelihood of liability under rule 10b-5 is
remote.
In the case of Fischer v. Klet, 23 7 an accounting firm remained
silent after discovering that the financial statement it had previously
certified, and which was filed on Form 10-K, was false. The court
refused to dismiss an action by investors against the firm, brought
pursuant to rule 10b-5. There was clearly an absence of privity be-
tween the plaintiff, an allegedly defrauded purchaser of the stock of
Yale Express Company, and the accounting firm. Significantly, there
was no assertion in the complaint that the accounting firm "aided and
234 Bradley, Auditors' Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 906-07 (1965).
235 Id. at 909; 916-17.
236 H.L. Green v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
237 260 F, Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y, 1967),
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abetted" in defrauding the plaintiff. But the court noted that previ-
ously a defendant had been held liable under rule 10b-5 where it
remained inactive in the light of a claimed duty to make disclosure,
and where it knew that its inaction adversely affected those to
whom that duty was owed.2 38  Although the court was not certain
that the same decision would result in the absence of an allegation
of conspiracy or of aiding and abetting, which distinguished the case
before it from other cases, it noted the "novel and difficult issues"
raised, and found a need to develop further facts. The defendant did
not fit into the usual categories of persons held liable under rule
10b-5 (i.e., insiders, broker-dealers, issuers and aiders and abettors),
and the "central issue" was whether the defendant could be held lia-
ble when it "did not directly gain from its failure to disclose its dis-
covery of the falsity of the financial statements.1239 The motion to
dismiss was denied by the court, without prejudice to the renewal
of the motion at trial.
240
The essence of the accounting firm's alleged violation was: (1) its
knowledge of the falsity of its previously certified statement, (2) its
duty to reveal that knowledge, (3) its failure so to reveal, and (4) its
awareness of the effect of its silence. But the court was not con-
vinced that even if all these elements were proved, liability would
have been established. Clearly, however, there could be no liability
without these factors.24 1 Moreover, the omission must have related
to a material fact and must have caused the harm alleged.
242
The independent accountant does not stand to profit personally
from his errors, and the possible consequences of allowing recovery
liberally can be severe. Conscious error or severe departure from
standards of due care and auditors' responsibilities should be a pre-
238 Id. at 192; Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). More recently, the issuer was held liable as an aider and abettor
when, with knowledge of fraudulent activities in the market affecting its
stock, it remained silent. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
239 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see Note,
Securities-Rule lOb-5-Accountant Held to Duty to Disclose Material Errors
in Certified Financial Report Discovered Subsequent to Filing, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 208 (1968).
240 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
241 The SEC, in an amicus curiae brief, summarized its understanding of
the liability as follows: "Failure by an accountant to disclose that financial
statements of a company which it has certified are false when it has become
aware of the fact is, under Rule 10b-5 (3), an act or course of business which
operates as a fraud on persons in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities of that company." Memorandum of SEC at 7, Fischer v. Kletz,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,844, at 95,889 (1967).
242 Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1437 (1967).
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requisite of liability.2 43
Honest errors of judgment with respect to product line reporting
would seem to lack the requisites to impose liability on the accountant.
Even a failure to report product line results, when based on the
accountant's honest mistakes of judgment, would seem to be lacking
the necessary basis for a claim under rule 10b-5 in that it could not
be asserted that the accountant had become aware that the statement
was false. Whatever danger which might exist from defective prod-
uct line reporting would result from the certification of a financial
statement in disregard of appropriate accounting principles.
Liability from Uncertified Documents
Unlike sections 11 and 18, the liability of an accountant under
rule 10b-5 might extend beyond that based upon certified statements.
If product line reporting appears in a portion of the financial state-
ment to which the certificate does not pertain, or if such results are
reported in a document issued by management, there is no representa-
tion by the accountant with respect to such information. Yet, the
liability of the accountant under rule 10b-5 in connection with the
management's representations was dealt with as a separate issue in
Fischer v. Kletz.244
In that case, Yale Express Company published interim financial
statements that were not certified and which the plaintiff claimed
were false and misleading, and which he further asserted the defend-
ant accounting firm knew were false and misleading. The plaintiff
asserted that there was liability under rule 10b-5, although no
claim was made under common law.245 The court held that there
was no basis in law for imposing upon the accountant a duty to dis-
close its knowledge of the falsity of the interim financial state-
ment.246 But, although the court expressed doubts on the matter, it
found that there was an issue as to whether the firm had rendered
substantial "assistance or encouragement"2 47 to Yale's allegedly i11e-
243 Cf. Comment, Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure of Post-Certi-
fication Discovery of Error, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 500, 509 (1968).
244 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
245 The SEC took no position on this aspect of the complaint. However,
elsewhere in its brief it said that the accounting firm's "legal duty to public
investors arises from its certification of Yale's financial statements included
in the 1963 annual report and in the Form 10-K filed with the Commission."
Memorandum of SEC at 4, Fischer v. Kletz, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder],
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 91,844, at 95,888 (1967). Plaintiff, in its brief, con-
tended that the accounting firm was liable under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act "as an aider and abettor of management's 1964 violations of that statute."
Brief for Plaintiff at 7a, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
246 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
247 Id. at 197; see REsTATEmT OF ToRTs § 876 (1938).
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gal conduct. Therefore, the court refused at this early stage of the
litigation, at a time when discovery was barely underway, to dismiss
the complaint.2 48
Yale Express' practice of consulting its auditors before publishing
an unaudited financial statement is fairly typical. Matters in a pro-
spectus, annual report, or proxy statement which relate to financial
data often are examined by auditors although no opinion is expressed
with respect to those matters. 49 However, the auditors will, on occa-
sion, make suggestions to management dealing with the presentation of
the material. This is similar to the conduct characterized by the
plaintiff in Fischer v. Kletz as "substantial assistance or encourage-
ment" which, in that case, consisted of a recommendation to use in-
ternal figures when the auditor "did not know that such figures
were accurate. ' 250 While the court refused to dismiss the complaint,
the strong impression remains that if the plaintiff were unable to
make a stronger case than he had made thus far, the complaint
would be dismissed on this count as failing to state a cause of action.
If what has just been described, then, constitutes the substance
of the auditor's involvement with product line results issued by
management, there should be no serious threat of auditor's liability.
This comment is both a prediction and a hope. It would be unfortu-
nate if the zeal of aggrieved investors were permitted to cause
heavy penalties to auditors who seek to guide management in the
presentation of meaningful information, but who make no examina-
tion of the underlying data. They are neither paid to do so nor do
they represent to anyone that they have done so. For purposes of
assisting management, the auditors should be able to assume that the
data furnished them is accurate. If the threat of liability is increased,
however, the alternatives are clear-and unfortunate. Either auditors
will seek substantially higher fees for performing much wider duties,
or they will refuse to assist management. In either case the loss will
be most keenly felt by investors.
One of the unaudited items upon which independent accountants
might work is the earnings statement that an issuer customarily will
publish covering the twelve month period following the effective date
of a 1933 Act registration statement. The effect of such publication is
that if any person acquires securities sold pursuant to a registration
248 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There was a
special factor present in this case arising from the fact that the accounting
firm had undertaken a special study of the company. Id. at 184.
249 1 L. Loss, SEcURITms REGULATION 327 n.26 (2d ed. 1961); WHm COR-
PORATiONS Go PuBLic 141 (Israels & Duff eds. 1962); MAuTz, supra note 19,
at 141.
250 Brief for Plaintiff at 25, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
statement after the publication of the earnings statement, he cannot
recover under section 11 of the 1933 Act by reason of an untrue state-
ment unless he can prove that he relied thereon. 251 There is no re-
quirement of certification of the earnings statement, nor is the form
prescribed, but accountants customarily review the manner of presen-
tation and the contents of the statement.
252
The earnings statement is not filed with the Commission and
therefore is not subject to Regulation S-X.253 But the purpose of the
statement is to reduce the risk of liability in a public offering. Its
use in this manner makes it a "device" used "in connection with the
purchase or sale of [securities] ."254 Therefore, it falls within the scope
of rule 10b-5.
Unlike the accounting firm in Fischer v. Kletz, the accountant
has a personal stake in publishing an earnings statement, because the
publication will make it more difficult to impose liability on any of
the potential defendants under section 11, including the accountants.255
However, no special responsibility of the accountant to the market-
place can be attached to the statement, as it is neither certified nor
filed with the Commission. Hence, the accountant need not fear
implication in any civil liability resulting from the publication of this
statement unless he gives "substantial assistance or encouragement"
to its preparation. Merely reviewing the statement should not be
viewed as "substantial. 2 56
Product line reporting will probably be necessary in the section
11 (a) earnings statement to the same extent that it would be required
in the prospectus if it is to have the desired effect of forcing a plain-
tiff to show reliance. Even if the original prospectus did not show
product line results, changes in the affairs of the company might make
it necessary to do so. Thus, a requirement of product line reporting
may make it slightly more difficult to build an obstacle to section 11
liability, but the process of creating that obstacle probably will not
by itself present any significant risks to the accountant.
Conclusion
In a real sense, the most important legal implication of extended
financial reporting by diversified companies which can be drawn from
251 Securities Act of 1933 § Ila, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964) (last sentence).
252 3 L. Loss, SECUPITiES REGULATION 1725 (2d ed. 1961); L. RAI'PAPORT,
SEC AccouNTING PRAcTIcE Aim PRocEDuRE § 23.3 (rev. 2d ed. 1966).
253 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (1968).
254 Id. § 240.10b-5.
255 In Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court said
it placed no weight on the lack of an allegation of gain by the accountant,
but said that it raised an interesting question. Id. at 193.
256 Id. at 197.
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this analysis is the freedom from serious legal implications. It was
stated at the outset that the thrust of this inquiry was to test the
gravity of the risks of the additional responsibilities which would
be created by product line reporting. Serious burdens and risks
exist under present law and practice but, from a legal standpoint,
neither the risks nor the burdens would be appreciably increased by a
requirement of product line reporting. Thus, the potential liability
of corporations or of auditors is not a persuasive argument against
new requirements for financial reporting.
This conclusion by no means resolves the larger question of
whether, or in what form, such requirements should be adopted, but
it does compel us to examine the issue on different grounds. Initially
we must determine what can be gained from product line reporting.
While that question is not essentially a legal one, lawyers are not
unconcerned with the answer. It must be emphasized, however, that
the efficacy of any regulatory change must be tested by its economic
impact as well as by its legal one.
As noted earlier,257 a convincing case has been made for extended
reporting. There is a growing tendency toward the creation of large
diversified companies. These conglomerate entities are more com-
mon and more important in our economy today than ever before.
Under existing reporting practices, investors may be receiving signifi-
cantly less information than the federal securities laws* consider
essential. If this is true, then some modification or adaptation of our
methods of reporting is in order. Again, it is important for lawyers
to consider the power under existing law to accomplish this. Much
will depend on the manner in which the SEC acts upon the problem.
The SEC has pursued a desirable approach to this problem by
soliciting and awaiting the views of interested private groups before
acting. Obviously, the Commission will consider carefully Dr. Mautz's
findings, and those of other studies, before it acts. Not every problem
facing a government agency can be solved in this manner, but it is
laudable that when the opportunity presents itself it is utilized.
At the same time, financial executives and the accounting pro-
fession must turn their attention to improvements in the financial re-
porting of diversified companies. A further development in the prac-
tice of accounting and financial reporting is needed to meet changing
conditions. The goal should be the attainment of a level of proficiency
whereby auditors can confidently certify management product line
breakdowns and allocations of joint costs.
A sure way to sabotage the federal securities laws is to regard
them as fixed and immutable and to ignore changing times. It is en-
257 See text accompanying notes 12-46 supra,
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tirely appropriate that the Commission's proposal on product line re-
porting be carefully examined, and, if found to be unnecessary or
deficient in some respect, be rejected. However, the argument of
some executives and accountants has a nostalgic ring of the 1930's.
Dr. Mautz found that much of the opposition by business executives
to extended reporting stemmed from a desire to keep the rules of
the game the same. In answer to this opposition, he observed:
[T]he rules are changing, however. As a matter of fact, the game is
changing, partly due to the executives' own activities. The formation
of diversified companies in itself changes the environment in which
management lives. In many ways management becomes a victim of
its own initiative and success. Because business management does
well, society continues to take an increasing interest in its activities.
The current interest in the financial reporting of conglomerate com-
panies is but one indication of this increasing awareness. 258
It should be possible to fulfill the needs of investors without im-
periling management or creating impossible tasks for accountants. A
cooperative effort on the part of all groups concerned with making the
federal securities laws serve their purpose is needed to accomplish the
task. The Commission must recognize and take account of the diffi-
culties in new proposals and the private sector must recognize and
take account of the needs of investors in a changing economic climate.
Hopefully, as Chairman Cohen testified, "the result will be a higher
quality of financial information to investors and to others who are
interested in the performance of American industry."259
258 MAuTZ, supra note 19, at 79-80.
259 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 1988 (1966).
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Addendum
Following the completion of this article, the SEC announced pro-
posed amendments to the registration forms under the 1933 and 1934
Acts which would require disclosure of product line results. 260 The
highlights of the proposal are:
(1) Companies would be required to show the approximate con-
tributions to sales and/or revenues, and to net income (excluding
extraordinary items), for each of the last five years of "each class of
related or similar products or services"1261 which contributed 10 per-
cent or more to total sales or revenues or to total pre-tax net
income during either of the two preceding fiscal years. If it were not
practicable to show contribution to net income, the company would
be required to show contribution to earnings most closely approach-
ing net income or loss.
(2) If practicable, companies would indicate the amount of as-
sets employed in each segment of the business for which separate
operating results were shown.
(3) If 10 percent of sales or revenues were derived from over-
seas operations, from government procurement or from any single
customer, similar data as to revenues, earnings and assets employed
with respect to such source, as well as for those separate categories of
products or services within each such source which contributed 10
percent to total sales and revenues or net income, would be pre-
sented.
(4) The determination of separate reporting segments would
be left to management and would be based on consideration of differ-
ent rates of profitability, degrees of risk, growth opportunities and
all other relevant factors. A brief description of the basis of classifi-
cation would be required.
(5) Since contributions to net income would be shown if pos-
sible, all cost items would have to be allocated among the various
segments. This requirement rejects the notion of "defined profit," of
which Chairman Cohen had spoken earlier.2 2 Perhaps a "defined
profit" approach might be employed when it would be impracticable
to show contribution to net income. But if the allocation of joint
costs or the pricing of intra-company transfers would affect mater-
ially the separately stated income of any segment, the method of
allocation would have to be shown. Nonetheless, segments of a
business between which substantial amounts of products or services
were transferred could be consolidated for reporting purposes.
260 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4922 (Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8397) (Sept. 4, 1968).
261 Id. at 1-3.
262 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
(6) Disclosure would be made in the text of Forms S-1 and S-7
under the 1933 Act and Form 10 under the 1934 Act, all under the
captions describing the registrant's business. No presentation would
be required in any financial statements.
The amendments would affect only companies which are offering
securities under a 1933 Act registration statement or which are first
registering under the 1934 Act, either because they have just listed
their securities on a national securities exchange or because they have
just attained the requisite size.263 To reach the annual reports of
other companies will require changes in the annual report on Form
10-K or under the proxy rules. This may be forthcoming. The Com-
mission's release announcing the proposed changes states that "[c] om-
parable amendments to other disclosure requirements have been de-
ferred pending the completion of the study which is currently being
made by the Commission 264 of disclosure under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1265
Most of the problems created by the Commission's rules have
been anticipated and discussed in the literature. The Commission's
release acknowledges that it has considered Dr. Mautz's study and the
writings of the AICPA and the National Association of Accountants,
among others. Mautz's impact is seen clearly, for example, in the
criteria for identifying the segments for which separate reports of
operating results would be required 266 and in the Commission's deci-
sion to leave the application of these criteria to management.267
Several new problems appear, however. The Commission seeks to
have companies show the amount of assets employed in each signifi-
cant segment, contrary to the author's expectations.2 8  Serious ac-
counting problems, to which little attention has been devoted as yet,
will be involved in implementing'this requirement. It is in recogni-
tion of the difficulties, perhaps, that the Commission has asked that
this information be furnished "if practicable." The information will
be useful, however. For example, only with such information can one
compute return on investment or turnover of inventory, both of
which are important tools in investment analysis.
More surprising is the proposed requirement that companies
disclose information with respect to large single customers. If
adopted, this requirement certainly would increase the problems faced
263 See note 57'supra.
264 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4885 (Nov. 29, 1967) (announcing
appointment of the Wheat Study Group).
265 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4922 (Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8397) at 2 (Sept. 4, 1968).
266 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
267 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
268 See note 27 supra and- accompanying text.
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by accountants and managers and would seem to justify management's
fears of competitive effect. The Commission is something less than
sure of itself in this proposal, however. The release announcing the
change stated that "[t]he Commission believes that such disclosure
with respect to a single customer merits consideration and invites
comments thereon. '269
In the main, the Commission has proceeded cautiously. As for the
subject matter of this article, the Commission's proposals do not re-
quire any significant revision of its comments or conclusions with
respect to the legal impact or the overall desirability of expanded
disclosure.
269 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4922 (Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8397) at 1 (Sept. 4, 1968).

